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# ***JPRS Report***

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# **Soviet Union**

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***International Affairs***

# Soviet Union International Affairs

JPRS-UIA-87-040

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2 NOVEMBER 1987

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**Review of Journal AZIYA I AFRIKA**

**SEGODNYA No 7, 1987**

18070401a Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English  
21 Jul 87 pp 1-4

[Text] "The Western Military-Industrial Complex and Developing Countries" is the title of an article by A. Kireyev. The author writes that, using the economic and technical dependence and the inequitable position of the newly-free states in the world capitalist economy, the military-industrial complex is trying to rope the most advanced of those states into its reproduction structure and make maximum use of their potentialities for the materialization of many aggressive designs of imperialism. As a result, growing militarization of developing countries has become a reality of international life.

One of the major expansionist functions performed by the MIC is insurance of unobstructed functioning of the vast number of Western military installations on the territory of newly-free states. In particular, a considerable share of the US armed forces, 550,000 servicemen, are stationed abroad, and there are some 1,500 US military bases on the territory of 32 foreign states.

The drive by the militarist circles of the imperialist powers to maintain their direct military presence in many parts of the developing world is largely motivated by their fear of the national liberation movement. That presence, according to Western strategists, should guarantee the safety of their overseas investments. In 1985, such investments in developing countries by US corporations alone totalled 54,474 million dollars.

The article reads that one of the instruments of involving developing states in the militarization process is international capitalist arms trade. The US and other NATO members account for about two-thirds of the world arms export, and countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America for almost three-quarters of their import. With their payments for the import of weapons and combat hardware from imperialist countries developing states boost the efficiency of arms production there whose growth is projected with necessary regard for the potential capacity of the external market.

The participation of developing states in arms trade falls as a heavy burden on their economies, diverting colossal funds which are so badly needed for the settlement of their pressing social problems. The growth in arms spending slows down the rates of economic development

of the newly-free states. There is a proven inverse relationship between the share of the GNP allocated for military purposes and the rates of economic development.

The peoples in developing countries seeking to overcome their backwardness and to attain the level of the industrialized states, A. Kireyev points out, rightfully associate the prospects of liberation from the debt burden which emaciates their economies, with limitation and elimination of arms, with the reduction of arms spending, and with the rechannelling of resources in favour of social and economic development. The MIC policy to involve developing nations in the war preparations of imperialism is in conflict with the modern epoch which is characterized by a clearly marked trend toward consolidation of national independence and sovereignty and intensification of the struggle by all countries and peoples for peace and international security.

In the article, "Russia's Inspiring Example," E. Komarov writes that, putting an end to imperialism's supremacy in the world, the Great October Revolution created favourable conditions for the growth and subsequent victory of national liberation movements. The major national leaders and statesmen of India, many of its veteran freedom fighters have more than once pointed out the importance of the Great October Socialist Revolution for the development of the Indian national liberation movement. In its turn, the growing national liberation struggle, particularly in India, weakening the rear of imperialism, paralysing its forces to a certain extent, giving rise to the solidarity of freedom fighters with the land of Soviets and strengthening positions and prestige of the latter, helped the young socialist state to firmly establish itself.

The author of the article emphasises that the new and inspiring prospects of social progress, which the victory of the October Revolution and the building of socialism in the USSR opened up, were of particular importance to rallying the mass of the Indian people to struggle for freedom. In the final analysis, it is precisely the impact of the victorious October Revolution and socialism built in Russia on the development of the social and political thought in India that activated the national liberation struggle to the highest degree. Opening up the new prospects of social progress, the Soviet Union's achievements fortified the faith of Indian progressives in their homeland's national revival.

The decisive role of the Soviet Union in the outcome of World War II led to the emergence of favourable international conditions for the victory of the national liberation movement, particularly in India, which was one of the first colonies in Asia to throw off in 1947 the yoke of colonial rule.

Concluding, E. Komarov writes that, in terms of history, the Great October Socialist Revolution and the victorious development of the national liberation movement in

India laid the solid foundation for present-day many-sided Soviet-Indian cooperation for the benefit of the peoples of both countries, in the interests of universal peace and progress.

A. Markov, D.Sc. (History), has contributed an article, "Nationalists' Imperial Claims."

Japanese nationalists have always aspired for supremacy in Asia and the Pacific so as to ensure Japan free access to fuel, raw materials and other resources of other states in the region, the Soviet historian writes. And however hard they may try to conceal their present-day hegemonic aspirations, their growing claims to Japan's special status in Asia, these claims are obvious.

The insistent striving of Japanese nationalists to galvanise the theory about the "common destinies" of Japan and other countries in the region assumes ever more outspoken hegemonic and militant orientation. Even Japanese financial, economic and technical aid is not only directed towards ensuring most beneficial terms of trade for itself and obtaining primary materials for its industry but also pursues certain political and military aims.

It goes without saying that in the conditions of Japan's military-political dependence on the United States, such activities are, in a final analysis, subordinated above all to strengthening the positions of Washington in the region, the article points out. This is a cause for the Japanese nationalists' growing dissatisfaction. True, it has so far been expressed in cautious form, yet ever more loudly, as the economic and technological power of Japan and its influence in the international arena increase.

In conclusion, A. Markov writes that whether Washington and Tokyo manage to find common ground in this matter or their neo-colonialist policy in Asia is carried out in conditions of further aggravation of inter-imperialist contradictions, the threat to the sovereignty and security of developing countries in the region posed by the two imperialist claimants to supremacy there will increase, anyway.

The journal also carries: an article, "Syria: a Party to Space Research," by A. Filonik and N. Kannunikov; the first instalment of I. Belyayev's study, "Egypt. The Revolution and the President"; an article, "Vietnam's Line for Restructuring," by A. Mirov; a series of materials on the 25th anniversary of Algeria's independence, and other materials.

#### Journal Reviews Past Events, Future Tasks on 30th Anniversary

18070401b Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA  
in Russian No 7, Jul 87 inside front cover

[Unattributed editorial: "Entering the Fourth Decade"]

[Text] Dear Friends:

You hold in your hands the 361st issue of our journal since the beginning of publication 30 years ago. The Oriental Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences began putting out the scholarly and socio-political journal SOVREMENNYY VOSTOK in July of 1957. Soon after the founding of the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences in March of 1961, the journal received the name of AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA and became the organ of both institutes, as well as the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with the Countries of Asia and Africa a short while later. The journal comes out today in six languages—monthly in Russian and bimonthly in English, French, Arabic, Dari and Portuguese—and is distributed commercially in almost a hundred states.

In declaring the goals of the new publication, its founders emphasized in an editorial in the first issue of SOVREMENNYY VOSTOK that "...the chief mission of the journal is to illuminate the contemporary political and economic situation in the countries of the foreign Orient. The journal will devote especial attention to problems of the further deepening of the overall crisis of capitalism and, first and foremost, the collapse of the colonial system and the worsening inter-imperialist contradictions in the Orient. Articles exposing the policy of creating aggressive blocs and military adventures, the economic, political and ideological expansion of the United States and other imperialist states in the Orient aimed at preserving colonialism and undermining peace will be published on the pages of the journal.

"...One of the most important tasks of SOVREMENNYY VOSTOK is to illuminate the struggle of the peoples of Asia and Africa for peace, freedom and independence. This struggle is today more and more acquiring a mass and all-encompassing nature.

"...The articles on the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle of the peoples of the Orient will give an analysis of the role of various classes, parties and organizations in that struggle."

It is no accident that we have quoted in such detail the old program appeal to the reader. Excerpts from it confirm once again that the editorial staff has always tried to adhere to the policy that was selected and were realistic in their forecasts of the future of the Afro-Asian world and the course of the political and social liberation of its peoples in the second half of the 20th century.

In leafing through the files of the last three decades, it can be seen clearly that the journal has always tried to move in step with the times, reflecting all of the most important and significant events, processes and phenomena in the developing world. The thousands and thousands of journal pages are, in essence, a chronicle of profound changes in the world, showing that our era is an era of transition from capitalism to socialism and communism, an era of competition between the two world

systems, an era of socialist and national-liberation revolutions and an era of struggle of the chief motivating forces of social development—world socialism, the workers' and communist movement, the peoples of the liberated states and mass democratic movements—against imperialism and its policies of aggression and oppression and for peace, democracy and social progress. One of the most major events of the 1950s-1970s and a most important distinguishing feature of the era was the victory of national-liberation movements, under whose onslaught the colonial system of imperialism in its classic forms collapsed and dozens of new, young independent states were formed in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The path of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries to liberation proved to be agonizing and difficult, and enormous sacrifices were borne and continue to be borne for the sake of a better future. The bloody war against the peoples of Indochina, the many years of blockade against Cuba, the trampling of the legal rights of the Palestinian people, the intervention in Lebanon, the undeclared wars against Kampuchea and Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua, the provocations against Syria and Libya, the armed seizure of defenseless Grenada—these are just some of the innumerable offenses of imperialism striving to prevent the advance of the young states onto the path of independent historical creation.

A familiarity with the course of the three decades of features in the journal has helped readers to see and understand more clearly how a new, complex and fluid set of contradictions has gradually taken shape between the developing countries and imperialism, which has created and fine-tuned a most refined and ruthless system of neocolonial exploitation for the purpose of binding a considerable number of the liberated states to it more closely. The forms and methods of exploitation have, of course, changed over these decades, but its essence today remains as before: imperialism continues to exist to a considerable extent through plundering the developing countries. Unequal exchange and trade, machinations and arbitrariness with accounts and the egoism of the multinational corporations all act in the same direction.

At the same time, as our readers well know, the resistance of the peoples of these countries to the policies of plundering and robbery is growing as well. They are continuing their stubborn and just struggle against neocolonialism and intervention in their internal affairs and against racism and apartheid. This resistance is objectively combined with the overall anti-imperialist struggle of peoples for freedom, peace and social progress.

AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA naturally cannot compete with newspapers and weeklies in the timeliness of commentary on current events, but rather consistently prefers to proceed deeper, uncovering and analyzing the socio-economic roots and primary causes of the most complex phenomena and processes that transpire in the

developing world. It is namely from this point of view that the journal approaches the illumination of materials from the April (1985) and January (1987) Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, the historic resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress, the realistically bold and truly revolutionary provisions and evaluations that were contained in the Political Report of the party Central Committee presented to the congress by M.S. Gorbachev along with the new edition of the CPSU Program adopted at the party forum.

Articles are published under the special rubric "The 27th CPSU Congress and the Liberated Countries" on such issues as the significance of Soviet peace initiatives for various regions of Asia and Africa, the organic link of disarmament and development, the role of mass democratic movements, especially the Afro-Asian solidarity movement, the struggle for peace and against the nuclear threat hanging over mankind through the fault of imperialism, social and class differentiation in the young states, their choice of paths for further development etc. A special place under this rubric is reserved for problems associated with the vital necessity of creating the all-encompassing system of national security developed by the 27th Party Congress, as well as bringing to life the principles of a non-violent peace free of nuclear weapons as proclaimed in the Delhi Declaration.

The task of not allowing the Asian-Pacific region, whose population is a colossal human and socio-political body that requires, as M.S. Gorbachev emphasized in a speech in Vladivostok, steadfast attention, study and respect, to be turned into an arena for military and political confrontations has recently become a more and more topical task for the future of all mankind. Every country of Asia and Oceania, he said, has "its own social and political structure with every conceivable nuance, its own traditions, achievements and problems, its own way of life and beliefs, its own convictions and preconvictions and its own understanding of spiritual and material values. ... Everything is in motion here, and not all is becoming stabilized. The new replaces the old, and institutions that yesterday seemed immutable give way to the whirlwind of change—social, scientific, technical, ideological." Taking all of this into account, we will devote enhanced attention in our publication to the problems of the Asian-Pacific region in the future as well.

Does all of this mean that the collective of the journal is satisfied with what has been achieved and sees no shortcomings in its work? Of course not. Significant changes in the life of society dictate for us the necessity of arranging a more direct and reciprocal link with the readers, taking into account much more fully their requests and interests, observations and suggestions, and raising the ideological and political level, information saturation and effectiveness of the published material. For this purpose, oral issues of the journal and reader conferences are being introduced, and a rubric has been introduced where timely answers can be given to questions coming to the editors, and new rubrics have also

been introduced devoted to topical problems of Asia and Africa. To chase all sorts of stereotypes from its pages, to call things by their true names, to encourage an innovative approach by authors to complex and often disputed problems in the developing world, boldly to combine scholarly analysis of these problems with accessibility of exposition—these are the tasks facing AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA entering its fourth decade.

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**Imprimatur of Nasser on Egyptian Revolution Stressed**

*1807401c Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 7, Jul 87 pp 14-18*

[Article by Doctor of Economic Sciences I. Belyayev: "A Revolution and a President"]

[Excerpts] Over my life I have had occasion to see quite a long list of most interesting state figures, converse with them and observe them from afar, especially from Moscow. One of them was Gamal Abdel Nasser—the first president of republican Egypt. I am convinced that if anyone in the last three decades of the history of this country has maintained not only partnership ties, but truly allied relations as well, with the Soviet Union, and moreover on an upward sweep, it was namely him.

One lucky day I somehow managed to get the opportunity of posing to Nasser a question, as they say, straight out: "Someone in Cairo has recently been fastening his eyes too often on the United States, where, possibly, partners are being sought. What do you intend to do, Mr. President?"

Nasser looked attentively at me with a long and, it seemed to me, penetrating glance, smiled and said: "The Americans want my head! That's the answer to your question..."

Frankly speaking, I was taken aback. Nasser, as they say, "hit the nail on the head" with my doubts, speaking so candidly. The Americans in fact wanted his head! Beginning in 1955...

When I think about the fate of the Egyptian Revolution that occurred 35 years ago, I involuntarily quite genuinely and even staunchly link it with the name of Nasser. Not only because after his death Sadat came to power, destroying both the revolution and Egypt, or at least the appearance of the largest Arab country. I recall that it was namely the figure of Nasser that towered over other Egyptian and Arab politicians in the 1950s and 1960s.

### The Beginning

Gamal Abdel Nasser, the son of a postal official, born in 1918 in Upper Egypt, a man from the "middle-class," as we say in this country, segments of the largest Arab country, became a revolutionary nationalist. He passed through an extremely rapid ideological evolution. And moreover a very complex one in which was reflected much of the life of Egypt in the 1950s and especially the 1960s. Nasser, in July of 1952 a restrained reformist, became by the end of the 1960s a confirmed Arab socialist. It is no accident that I write of him as an Arab figure. Whether he wanted it or not, any step he took on the path of transformations in Egypt was immediately echoed in the whole Arab world. Such was the enormous force of the political influence of this extraordinary man on those around him. He thus always had to imagine clearly how the whole Arab world would perceive his latest reforms within the country, as well as the most important steps in the sphere of Arab international politics.

After failing the entrance exams for the Cairo Military Academy, the young Nasser (in his soul he always aspired to a military profession) entered the university in the capital in the legal department, but was not a student for long. He was not attracted by the law. In less than a year he left the university and was able to enroll in the military academy nonetheless, caught up with what he had missed and in 1938 received officer's epaulets.

Nasser moved up the service ladder quite successfully. He was already a lieutenant colonel in 15 years. Thanks to his natural gifts of attracting the sympathy of those around, the 35-year-old officer soon came to be at the center of attention of many that were interested in the events transpiring around them. Egypt was still under the control of the British. By the way, Nasser got along famously with the British officers with whom he served. It would seem that the British did not diminish their Egyptian colleagues. But they allowed them to approach them only to a certain precisely maintained distance. In everything! Even though the time of the imperial policies of Great Britain, it would seem, had passed. As a result, for his whole life Nasser was permeated with a feeling of the need to fight for a restoration of the dignity of the Egyptians, trampled by the British. Especially those whom the British did not even feel were people—the ordinary mortals. For them they were plebes and servants whom the British had long been accustomed to ordering about.

In 1947 Nasser, like all Egyptians, for the first time encountered a political puzzle: the UN General Assembly, on November 29 of that unforgettable year for all Arabs, adopted the resolution on the partitioning of Palestine on religious grounds into Arab and Jewish states.

If one judges from the position of mankind overall, it looked quite simple. After all, Arabs and Jews had lived, as they say, side by side for 13 centuries. Why couldn't the two neighboring states get along? The political and especially the religious realities that existed at that time in Palestine, however, as well as the claims of Israel against the Arabs, inclined them toward other thoughts. And, of course, toward other perceptions both of what transpired and of the future unpleasant consequences.

The Palestinian problem, which at that time occupied the whole Arab world, gave an impetus to the creation of the secret Free Officers organization, which ultimately led to the coup d'état of 23 Jul 52 and laid the foundation for the Egyptian national-liberation revolution.

The secret organization of officer-patriots, more precisely officer-nationalists, was born in 1949. Its founder and soul, the generator and creator of its philosophy, was Nasser. Anwar Sadat, right after the death of the first president of Egypt, asserted that it was namely he and no one else who had put together the core of the Free Officers. To this day I still do not grasp why he felt the need to falsify, in particular, his role in creating the organization. It seems as if the "president-heir," as Sadat called himself, was already by that time "winning points" as the head of state with the "fat cats" playing up to him, and the country was driven into a formal counter-revolution. And possibly for precisely that reason! After all, Sadat wanted very much to be numbered among the "founders." It is noteworthy that almost all of the members of the Revolutionary Command Council still alive at the time did not applaud him. They voiced their indignation aloud at the lies of Sadat, laughing at his "discovery."

The reputation of Nasser even gained from Sadat's falsification. His titanic work in creating a "new man" on the banks of the Nile bore fruit nonetheless. The simple Egyptians also laughed at Sadat, although not out loud.

We will return, however, to the pre-revolutionary years. They are extremely important for an understanding of all that the revolution brought, when a lieutenant colonel in the Egyptian Army came to lead the country. I think it is no accident that even when he was the commander-in-chief of the Egyptian armed forces, Gamal Abdel Nasser remained a lieutenant colonel, that is, the rank he had reached by July of 1952, forever. The sole distinction he permitted himself consisted of the fact that a commander-in-chief's cap was made for him which he, by the way, never put on, since he felt that external trappings had no significance. At the end of the 1940s, Nasser, along with several of his comrades in the existing organization, were in the Negev Desert as part of the Egyptian Expeditionary Corps thrown by King Farouk against the newly appeared state of Israel. He was able to meet Israeli officers there and discuss the Palestinian problem and

the future role of Israel with them. He conducted quite animated discussions in those days in particular with the current defense minister of Israel, General Yitzhak Rabin, then still a major.

I recall this for the following reason. Nasser never felt any prejudice whatsoever against the Jews and the state of Israel. It only seemed to him that the new realities of the Near East should have been looked at differently than they were by the Arab political leaders. And only after having become convinced that the leaders of Israel looked on what was happening quite differently, advancing to the forefront the creation of Eretz Yisrael, the "Greater Israel," was Nasser compelled to reject his earlier approach to the problem of the partitioning of Palestine. Peaceful co-existence with a state with claims to the land of his own country was categorically ruled out.

As I have already noted, everything that transpired then served as the reason for the creation of the Free Officers organization. Its appearance was the result of the reaction of the patriots of Egypt to the Palestinian tragedy and the excesses that were created around it. There were also Egyptians that hurried to fish in the muddled waters of the Palestinian maelstrom. King Farouk himself, the last Egyptian monarch, who surrendered to the revolution in 1952, got rich off the deliveries of unfit weapons to his own army (!), which had entered the borders of the former Palestine, arousing terrible hatred among his own officers and men. He became the embodiment of servility to the British and of monstrous corruption. The officers, largely from the captains to the lieutenant colonels, joined the Free Officers organization hoping for decisive changes.

It is very rarely recalled today that Nasser understood that officers alone could not carry out a revolution. They needed either the direct support of or solidarity with the patriotic forces of the country. He especially took into account the vital necessity of the neutralization of the Muslim Brotherhood and the arrangement of important contacts with the left, including the communists. Pluralism in the progressive movement predominated at that time in Egypt. Thus, at the beginning of the 1950s there were almost twenty Marxist parties and groups existing here. It was possible to encounter the most varied of figures and coalitions of individuals among their leaders, all with pretensions of being called the "true patriotic forces of Egypt." Nasser, however, considered the army to be the principal force of the future coup d'état.

At that time, 35 years ago, his approach to the armed forces and its core—the officer corps—as the sole force able to bring down the sagging monarchy in Egypt, and the British who secretly and clearly were supporting King Farouk along with it, was correct. It ensured success on 23 Jul 52. Only by following this concept in evaluating the role of the military in the national-liberation revolution, as they say, "to the end" was Nasser led to the distressing results of which I will speak below. He was

resolved not to turn to the masses for assistance, not to be supported by them. According to his convictions, everything should proceed from the top in a revolution. Only after the radicalization of reforms and the advancement of socialist formulas was the interaction of the "upper" and "lower" reaches somewhat altered.

The first step of the Revolutionary Command Council created for the actual leadership of the country after the successful military coup in Cairo was a decision to exile the overthrown King Farouk from the country. Along with his heirs. The monarchy was, however, preserved in Egypt, to the surprise of many. Such a cautious step was vintage Nasser. He calculated all of his decisions and weighed his actions in a most careful manner. Not being confident that all Egyptians, having supported the expulsion of the king, would welcome the destruction of the monarchy as a state institution, Nasser and the officers that had come to power went for a step that, from their point of view, promised success. The monarchy was overthrown, the monarchy was preserved. They of course had their reasons for such tactics, although at first glance they were of a somewhat half-hearted nature. Many representatives of the leftist forces felt that the new leaders of the country didn't even try to shake the foundations of semi-feudal Egypt. They were wrong. The monarchy was liquidated as early as 1953, and all political parties were dissolved later, when paths were cleared to storm the strong positions of the British.

And here I would like to recall a specific feature of Nasser's tactics. He understood that the destruction of British dominion was a complex and even dangerous enterprise for a revolutionary regime that had not put down roots among the people. England was consolidated quite strongly in the country of the pyramids. It had bastions in every sphere of the life of the Egyptians. Even in the anti-British Wafd Party there were quite influential figures that had never lifted a finger against their oppressors, or the monarchy either.

Agrarian reform began in Egypt in August-September 1952. I remember how we in Moscow were quite skeptical at the time toward this step of the Revolutionary Command Council. There were, of course, grounds for this perception. After all, taking into account the hunger for land (i.e., the country, the 200 feddans /a feddan is 0.42 hectares) that were kept by the major landowners were still quite a bit. The fellahs got five or six feddans apiece. If one recalls, however, how important the reform was for engendering confidence among the popular masses that the revolution was taking the course of eliminating large land ownership, then our skepticism proved to be unjustified. After a total of ten years the maximum cultivation was reduced decisively—to 100 feddans. The major feudal lords were finished in Egypt.

Soon after the beginning of agrarian reforms, the industrialization of the country began to be discussed and

became the daily practice after several years. The creation of a state sector in industry had enormous significance for the revolution. A new life began on the banks of the Nile, and this inspired confidence in the allies of Nasser that the revolution was on the right track.

At the same time, the Revolutionary Command Council was occupied with deciding the issue of issues—negotiations with Great Britain on the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal Zone. It seems to me that this event had especial significance for the expanding revolution. Nasser was quite fearful of the countermeasures from London that could follow the seizure of power by the Free Officers in Cairo. The fact that such measures were possible was quite evident. After all, the British had enough soldiers in the Suez Canal Zone, and the distance from Port Said or the Suez to Cairo was no greater than 150 kilometers. The future revolution was spared these experiences by the maneuverings of Nasser. He gave the Americans to understand that the Egyptian Army intended to overthrow King Farouk and that the officers that came to power as a result of the coup d'état would conduct policies that could be favorable to Washington.

Some observers had many questions at the time. They were answered later in the famous book of Miles Copeland, "The Game of Nations". He showed in quite a bit of detail what the United States, unexpectedly advanced to center stage in the events in Egypt, was counting on. The Americans gave London to understand that the dispatch of British soldiers to Cairo was undesirable. Subsequent events showed that the concessions the United States expected from Nasser and his cohorts in return for their support never materialized. That is where the first features of American participation in the game, whose purpose was to eliminate Nasser and bring "more reliable" military or compliant politicians from the point of view of Washington to power, began. Israel became the main participant in the secret game. In 1955 the Israeli Army made a provocative raid on Gaza. The result was over 50 dead Arabs. Israel got off cheaply: the raid was condemned by several foreign newspapers—and that was all! Ben-Gurion, who headed the Israeli government at the time, was sure that the flagrant disdain for international public opinion was the best of all methods for conducting policy in the Near East. He furthermore understood perfectly that the "actions beyond the mission" were a demonstration to the whole world that the new leaders in Egypt could not defend their own country.

The impact was unexpected. In Bandung, where the historic conference of the liberated countries of Asia and Africa was held in 1955, Nasser met with the minister of foreign affairs of the PRC, Zhou Enlai. Among the issues they discussed was this: to whom could he appeal for the sale of the arms that Egypt needed so badly. Naturally, to repel the enemy. Whoever it might be. "To the Soviet Union," replied Zhou Enlai.

The conference was held in April, and in September Nasser announced that Egypt would procure Soviet weapons. Yes, Soviet ones!

What a bombshell that was! In exploding, it created an echo in the United States and England, as well as in France. And how! The Western monopoly on arms deliveries to the liberated countries of the Third World was violated. The future consequences of what had happened were unforeseeable. The Americans were the first to try to convince Nasser to reject what he planned. George Allen, an assistant U.S. secretary of state, appeared in Cairo. He arrogantly read the riot act to Nasser. He was shown the door in response.

The British were meanwhile preparing to evacuate their soldiers in the Suez Canal Zone. In June of 1956, right after the departure of England from Egypt, Nasser became its first president.

Egyptian-Soviet relations then began picking up speed. In March of 1954 a trade agreement had been signed between the USSR and Egypt and a resolution adopted on the transformation of the missions of the two countries into embassies. (In 1953-56 Egypt also established diplomatic and trade relations with Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, East Germany and China.) We will look closely at what transpired. Egypt, for so long under the heel of the British, suddenly seeks and finds the support of Moscow! The British could well imagine what this might signify. After all, they had done much in the past, especially in the 19th century, so as to "keep the Russians" and, after the October Revolution, the Soviet Union out of the Near East. And suddenly "some Egyptian officer," who had become the head of state as the result of a coup d'état, appealed to the Russians for support! Could this really be tolerated? Of course not. And in London they fell to thinking about how to "teach a lesson" to Nasser, and if he succeeded, simply to throw him out.

#### (Conclusion to follow)

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#### Vietnamese CP Sixth Congress, Country's Problems Assessed

18070401d Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA  
in Russian No 7, Jul 87 pp 19-22

[Article by A. Mirov under the rubric "In the Countries of Socialism": "Vietnam—The Course of Renewal"]

[Excerpts] July 2, 1976. "A historic step in the life of the Vietnamese people has been taken. Today all of Vietnam from Cao Lanh to Minh Hoi is one!..." These words were solemnly proclaimed 11 years ago in Hanoi at a session of the National Assembly of the united Vietnam.

The innermost aspirations of the Vietnamese people had come true. Great and difficult tasks in restoring the national economy, destroyed by many years of war, however, still lay ahead. And here Socialist Vietnam was not alone. The Soviet Union and other fraternal states were at its side.

In our times, Soviet-Vietnamese relations serve as a visible example of socialist internationalism in action. The chief force that cements them is the fraternal union of the CPSU and the CPV [Communist Party of Vietnam]. Soviet-Vietnamese solidarity is founded on the ideas of Great October and was first manifested in the assistance rendered to the Vietnamese liberation fighters by Soviet communists and the young Soviet republic. The great Lenin and the prominent revolutionary internationalist Ho Chi Minh were at the source of our class brotherhood.

The fraternal collaboration of our countries is not limited to the socio-economic sphere. It is just as fruitful in the international arena. Along with all of the progressive forces of the planet, the USSR and the SRV [Socialist Republic of Vietnam], like the other countries of the socialist community, are in favor of eliminating the threat of world war, against the nuclear-missile arms race and its shifting into space and in favor of a ban on nuclear testing.

The consistent policy of steadfast reinforcement of the inviolable Soviet-Vietnamese friendship was demonstrated once again in the course of the official friendly visit of CPV Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Nguyen Van Linh to the Soviet Union in the spring of this year, which took place in an atmosphere of complete mutual understanding, brotherhood and cordiality.

The agreements at the highest level are opening a new period of our interaction and enhancing its effectiveness, first and foremost in an economic direction.

### The Lesson of Truth

Over all of the decades that have passed since the Second World War, Vietnam has remained a symbol of determination, courage and heroism for us—the heroism of a people that fought first for their national liberation and then for the re-unification of the country into a single socialist state.

The Vietnamese had to fight for 30 years in all. The criminal aggression of American imperialism alone cost the country some two million human lives. Twice as many explosives were dropped on the cities and villages of North Vietnam as on all of Europe during the Second World War. In the last ten-plus years, however, peace here has not been solid either. Even today the Vietnamese spill blood—both at their northern border and in fulfilling their internationalist duty in Kampuchea. The

losses since 1975 have already exceeded those that the country suffered in the course of the nine-year war of resistance against the French colonizers.

The misfortunes of others are ours too... This humanist principle has always guided the Soviet people in their relations with their Vietnamese brethren. They have stood alongside them both in difficult wartime and in the days of hard creative labor, rejoicing with all their hearts in their success in the construction of a peaceful life. And there have been more than a few successes.

The party of the Vietnamese communists and all of the workers of the country, following the maxims of their leader Ho Chi Minh, have done an enormous amount of work. The growth rate of industrial production in the last five-year plan was equal to 9.5 percent a year compared to 0.6 percent in 1976-80, while for agriculture it was 4.9 percent compared to 1.9 percent in the preceding five-year plan.

Over the last five years, several hundred relatively large and thousands of medium-sized and smaller facilities in the realms of power engineering, machine building, the petroleum and textile industries, irrigation, transport etc. have been built in the republic.

A step forward has also been taken in implementing progressive socio-economic transformations. The overwhelming portion of the peasants in the southern part of the country have moved onto the path of collective farming. The use of the achievements of scientific and technical progress and the contract method for organizing labor and paying wages have made an important contribution to raising agricultural production. It has shown the correct direction for reinforcing the collective sector of the economy in the villages.

Culture, education and health care have also been developed. The defensive capability of the country has been reinforced.

And so I repeat that there have undoubtedly been successes in building a peaceful life in Vietnam. But there have been other things as well—a passion for exaggerating them, a desire to rush forward, to pass off what is desired for what is effective and to embellish what has transpired. It is thus no accident that when the 6th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, held in December of last year, gave an objective analysis of what had been achieved and uncovered serious errors and omissions that had been tolerated over the last five years and had had a negative effect on the state of affairs in the national economy and the life of the population, it was quite unexpected for many of us. But sooner or later it is necessary to look truth in the eye, and the Vietnamese communists have done so.

And the objective realities are extremely harsh. Vietnam has set about the construction of socialism from a very low level of development and is only at the beginning of

the path. The consequences of the many years of devastating warfare have yet to be overcome in the country. The legacies of the old regime in the south are poverty, slums and an economy that is paralyzed to a considerable extent. Only 80 kilowatt-hours of power are generated per capita along with 90 kilograms of coal and a single kilogram of steel.

The history of the unified Vietnam is only 11 years old and, naturally, the unification of the separate countries that existed in the north and south for over two decades with opposing socio-economic systems on socialist principles within the framework of a single state (this is quite a new phenomenon in the world practice of socialist construction) continues to encounter serious difficulties.

The share of manual labor is 80 percent in the SRV. This figure is even higher in the areas inhabited by national minorities. Labor productivity is much lower than in the industrially developed countries. Vietnam lags far behind the majority of the socialist countries in the level of per-capita consumption. A rationing system for the acquisition of the principal types of foodstuffs and industrial commodities (rice, meat, sugar, clothing, fabrics, soap etc.) is preserved in the SRV for workers and state-sector employees along with some other segments of the population (the system of centralized supply does not extend to the remaining segments).

Prices in the country, where there is still a free market instead of a state one, continue to increase. At the same time, norms for supply in fixed prices are still too low. It is necessary to buy additional foods and other goods on the free market, where their prices are several times higher than on the state markets. By way of example, the average monthly wage there can buy a total of five or six pieces of soap or two or three kilograms of sugar.

All of this is eloquent confirmation of the conclusions of the 6th CPV Congress on the presence of serious disproportions in the country between supply and demand, as well as the still existing inability of state industry to provide the population with all needed goods.

Millions of Vietnamese are unemployed or underemployed. At the same time, the country has an extremely high rate of population growth (2.4 percent a year). The population is now 62 million. Every year a million people reach working age. In the second half of the 1970s, almost as many people reached that age as were born each year. This rate (4.5 percent!) is almost twice as high as that of the foreign Orient overall. It is no accident that the central newspaper, NHAN DAN, has currently called for a consideration of the fate of the 5-6 million people that will reach working age by 1990.

Under conditions of a low level of productive forces, the existing demographic situation is not only worsening the problem of finding jobs, but is also having a negative effect on the standard of living and the solution—especially in the major cities—of the housing problem.

The effect of the demographic factor is in turn aggravating the unequal development of productive forces. Over 75 percent of the whole population lives on the coast or in the flat country, which occupies only a third of the area of the republic. The relative resettlement is especially great in the Red River delta and the major cities.

It should also be mentioned that in a number of regions of South Vietnam, the activity of the bourgeoisie is still quite animated. The well-to-do peasants and the rural bourgeoisie (2.43 percent of peasant households) have nine times more land than the poor. Some 60 percent of the tractors are at the disposal of the well-to-do peasants. The fact that in the southern part of the country the unorganized market controls about 40 percent of retail sales turnover speaks for itself.

There is yet another whole series of problems.

That is why the CPV, at the last congress and in its activity in the period after the congress, has concentrated attention namely on unresolved issues and errors of a subjective nature. At their highest forum, the Vietnamese communists have noted the fact that many of the goals posed by the party have still not been achieved. In particular, they have been unable to achieve a stabilization of the socio-economic situation in the country. Although the volume of production has increased, this growth is insufficient compared to existing capabilities and needs, as well as compared to the funds that have been invested. A number of important indicators in the five-year plan have not been fulfilled, including those for the production of foodstuffs, coal and cement, which has affected the functioning of the whole national economy and the standard of living of the workers.

The efficiency of production and capital investment, as noted by the Vietnamese press, remains very low. Enterprises operate overall at just half of planned capacity. An acute shortage of many types of raw and other materials is felt in industry, including such important ones as metal, coke, cotton and petroleum. The low level of development of power engineering and transportation also has a restraining influence. The proportionate share of major industry, especially heavy industry, remains too small. It is still not able to supply the national economy with capital goods. Industry and agriculture are insufficiently linked. They do not constitute a unified structure. The system of economic management has not been fine-tuned to an adequate extent. Here bureaucratism, excessive centralism and departmentalism, in the opinion of our Vietnamese comrades, make themselves felt.

The Vietnamese press also points out the weakening role of the state sector in the economy. Social equity is violated and such negative phenomena in the life of society as bribery, corruption and regionalism can be found. All of this, the Vietnamese communists feel, is leading to a weakening of the faith of the popular masses in the ideals of the revolution and the ability of the state to surmount existing difficulties. Furthermore, in their

opinion, a definite rush in carrying out transformations in the initial stage of the transitional period, when the multi-institutional nature of the economy and the laws of money-exchange circulation were not taken into account, has had an effect on the state of affairs.

A tendency toward decline in the real income of workers and state-sector employees and the diversion of skilled manpower away from them as a consequence of it has arisen in the republic.

As our Vietnamese comrades note, in Vietnam, where it seems like every scrap of land is cultivated, the cultivation factor is still too low. Two million hectares are not worked for this or that reason, while eight million hectares of land in the desert or mountain regions have no vegetation cover.

The Vietnamese press also discusses the fact that the chief error in economic construction in recent years has been the policy of accelerating industrialization even though the requisite preconditions for it do not exist. Emphasis has been placed on the construction of major facilities and not on the radical solution of the food problem and the output of consumer goods. Proper attention has not been devoted to the development of agriculture. Foreign aid is utilized inefficiently. The 6th CPV Congress noted that it is impossible to proceed at a rapid rate without taking actual conditions and capabilities into account.

The party has uncovered many shortcomings in personnel work, declaring in particular that some managers are forgetting the necessity of constantly raising the level of their knowledge and serving as a model for others. Instances of separation from the masses, manifestations of conservatism and a lack of a sense of the new have not been eliminated.

One also cannot fail to note that the socialist course of Vietnam constantly met with and continues to meet with fierce resistance on the part of imperialism and domestic and foreign reaction, which have not abandoned their hopes for the restoration of capitalism in the country, making use of every opportunity for weakening the power of the people.

### **The Traveller Will Master the Road**

Under the extant conditions, the Vietnamese communists have made it their goal to overcome conservatism, inertia and a reluctance to restructure, on the one hand, and to eliminate haste, a simplistic approach and the desire to solve all issues at once in a short period of time, on the other. Only in that manner, they feel, will it be possible to achieve the all-round stabilization of the country's socio-economic situation and ensure the further creation of the essential preconditions for accelerating socialist industrialization in the later stages.

The Vietnamese communists indissolubly link the steadfast incarnation of socio-economic transformations with further improvements in the leadership and guiding activity of the CPV. Special significance in this regard is imparted to improving the work of party and state organs at all levels and reinforcing them with skilled personnel dedicated to the motherland.

In this new and very important stage in the life of the country, the party is posing as a paramount task improving management methods in all aspects of social development, reinforcing the primary party organizations and making ideological and political work among the masses more active. This activity is acquiring especial significance today, when party organizations have begun to be engaged more actively in socio-economic issues and young specialists with much initiative are being promoted into party work, which allows local CPV committees to delve into problems of economic and cultural construction and raise the level of economic management in the provinces and at enterprises.

The party sees the chief way of overcoming the difficulties as the further attraction of the people to active participation in socialist construction. Steps have been taken in the period since the congress to expand the rights of local organs of power and labor collectives.

In first place is the task of further raising agricultural production, resolving the food problem and providing industry with agricultural raw materials. The agrarian sector is also called upon to provide for growing export needs on an ever increasing scale, which will allow the state to increase its procurements of up-to-date machinery and equipment to implement socialist industrialization. The task of reliably supplying the national economy with electric power and fuels has to be solved in industry.

One testimony to the current renewal of work style is the more realistic approach to existing problems. This is testified to, for example, by the first measures for re-organizing capital-investment patterns. It has been decided, for example, to reduce the amount of new facilities by one quarter and to close down several construction projects temporarily. Work at a hundred has already been curtailed. Other facilities, and first and foremost those being constructed with the aid of the USSR, are planned to be erected more quickly.

Much attention is being devoted to establishing direct ties of Vietnamese enterprises with foreign firms and organizations on the basis of mutual advantage. Favorable terms are being created for such types of collaboration.

Small enterprises that use raw materials from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have recently begun to be set up for the purpose of easing the unemployment problem. This new form of collaboration makes it possible to employ many thousands of people on a permanent basis.

Steps are continuing to make the process of labor-resource redistribution more active in the interests of the more efficient utilization of free land on which agricultural crops are still not cultivated and to eliminate historically extant disproportions. The main flow of resettlers herein is being directed from the northern part of the country to the southern one and from the cities to the villages.

In view of the acuteness of demographic problems, the government of the SRV is making its efforts to implement control over the birth rate more active for the purpose of limiting the rate of population growth (up to 1.7 percent by 1990) as fast as possible.

A system of wage payments according to ultimate output as expressed in the incorporation of the "family contract" is being employed more and more widely in agriculture. It makes it possible to raise the material vested interest of the peasants in the development of production. Much attention is being devoted to the development of so-called "family economics," that is, subsidiary farming and cottage industries. A private producer is permitted, under the monitoring of state organs, to hire up to 10 people in a single shop. Other transformations are also being carried out.

Half a year has passed since the end of the congress. It is still clearly too early to speak of the results of the work in correcting the errors of the past. But it is quite apparent that this work is being done everywhere and that the masses are included in it.

The experience of Soviet-Vietnamese collaboration is also being re-interpreted in the republic. It has been recognized that it has not always been effective. The principal shortcoming is the lack of a comprehensive approach to collaboration. Soviet organizations have taken on responsibility just for the construction of facilities, not for production, and have not been engaged in the social and everyday aspects of affairs or the infrastructure. These shortcomings are being corrected today. The main thing is to raise the efficiency and return on collaboration.

This is all the more important as the amount of economic collaboration between the two states should double over the next five years. The economic aid of the Soviet Union to Vietnam over that period will be equal to the amount of aid over the whole preceding 30 years of our mutual business relations. The aid is oriented first and foremost toward the creation and development of the base sectors of the Vietnamese economy, those such as coal and oil extraction, machine building, the chemical industry and building materials.

"The path of renewal is full of difficulties: it is not easy to eliminate the stagnation and conservatism that have accumulated in our society over a short period of time."

wrote the journal *NOVOSTI VYETNAMA* recently. Harsh words. But, as they say in the Orient, "the traveller will master the road." Good luck, fraternal Vietnam!

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**Resurgence of Japanese 'Imperialism' Alleged**  
18070401e Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 7, Jul 87 pp 29-31

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences A. Markov: "Japan—The Imperial Pretensions of the Nationalists"]

[Text] The cherished desire of the Japanese nationalists has always been to take the dominant position in the Asian-Pacific region and to ensure for Japan unimpeded access to the fuels, raw materials and other resources of the states located there. The so-called theory of the "common destiny" of Japan and the other countries of Asia has long served as the manifestation of it. It was widely disseminated among the ruling and socio-political circles of the country at the beginning of the 20th century along with the formation and development of the aggressive policies of Japanese imperialism on the Asian continent and was always subordinate to the goals of its realization. It facilitated a sharp strengthening of pan-Asian aspirations in Japan and served the interests of the creation of the Greater East-Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Having proclaimed the demagogic slogan of "Asia for the Asians," the advocates of this theory made especially great use of it in preparing and carrying out the armed aggression of Japan in China, while the formation of the "independent" state of Manchukuo in China in 1932 was the first step on the path of bringing to life the idea of creating a "co-prosperity sphere."

It was namely Manchukuo, along with Japan and Korea, that was to serve as the core of the future "co-prosperity sphere," in which was also assumed the inclusion of China, the countries of Southeast Asia and India and which was to become the practical embodiment of the "common destiny" of the member-countries of it. "Manchuria has already obtained independence," wrote the prominent "pan-Asian" ideologist T. Murabuse in 1934. "Now it is China's turn. We cannot unwind the long threads linking Japan with India. For us it is enough to remember the cultural ties that bind Japan, India and China. The course of Japan in relation to China and India does not have partitioning or conquest as its goal. It proclaims the union of peoples."

Preparing to unleash war in the Pacific, militarist Japan was striving to open up free access for itself to the resources of the Asian countries that it had a particular need for, and the theory of "common destiny" was to have eased this task. The foreign-policy program of the

Konoe cabinet, published in 1940, envisaged the creation of a "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" under the leadership of Japan. Earlier, in speaking at a session of cabinet ministers, Konoe declared that Japan should take the leading position in this region. "It should be clear in all instances," he emphasized, "that Japan is the master in eastern Asia, and the European states are only guests." The prominent Japanese diplomat Arita asserted apropos of this issue that insofar as the countries of eastern Asia and the South Seas region were closely linked from a geographic point of view, destiny itself foreordained their collaboration with each other and the satisfaction of needs for the purpose of ensuring mutual well-being and prosperity, so as ultimately to construct a "new order" and a "sphere of co-prosperity" under the overall leadership of Japan.

In June of 1943, at the 82nd Extraordinary Session of the Japanese Parliament, the decision was made to create this "sphere of co-prosperity." In the course of preparing its realization, Tokyo granted formal "independence" to Burma, the Philippines and other countries and territories that had been dependent colonies of the Western powers and were occupied by the Japanese Imperial Army. The Japanese formed puppet governments there (Laurel in the Philippines, Pibunsongram in Thailand, Wang Jingwei in China etc.). Their task was to mobilize the resources of their countries for the purpose of ensuring the victory of Japan in the fight against the "white colonizers," that is, against the United States and England.

In May of 1943 it was proposed to include Outer Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) and the eastern portion of the territory of the Soviet Union right up to Baykal in the "co-prosperity sphere," the creation of which was proposed for completion within ten years. Japan hoped to seize these regions in the course of war against the USSR, which it was preparing to unleash after the "victorious conclusion" of the German Army offensive on Stalingrad in the fall of 1942 and spring of 1943, and then the Orel-Kursk Salient in the summer of 1943.

These plans, of course, suffered total ruin. After the unconditional surrender of Hitler's Germany in May of 1945, and then militarist Japan in September of that same year, any discussions of the "common destiny" of the latter with the Asian countries, and the more so the creation of a "co-prosperity sphere," were halted in Tokyo. But only temporarily.

Under the extant conditions, the Japanese ruling circles saw their chief task as creating a powerful economic, technical and financial potential for the country, especially for the purposes of penetrating the economies of the Asian states and restoring their lost positions in them with the assistance of its ally, the United States, and with the aid of the so-called "economic diplomacy" that Japan has conducted successfully in the 1960s and 1970s. Loudly parading the non-military, and chiefly the

trade and economic, aspects of its policies in these and other countries, insistently assuring their governments and societies of its exclusively peaceful intentions. Tokyo strove to create an image for Japan that supposedly would always refrain from arms and from war as a means of resolving disputes. This was explained not only by the extreme vested interest in the development of trade and economic ties with the Asian countries that the Japanese militarists had earlier tried to draw into the "co-prosperity sphere," but also a desire to prepare the soil for the resurrection of the theory of a "common destiny."

Today there is no need to prove that the assurances of the Japanese leaders had nothing in common with the actual state of affairs. A policy of "creeping militarization" of the country has in fact been implemented with the aid of the United States since the creation of the Japanese "self-defense forces" in 1954 and by the beginning of the 1980s has reached such a scale that it has simply become impossible to refute the obvious facts. With the coming to power of the cabinets of J. Suzuki and especially that of Y. Nakasone, the process of militarization in Japan has taken on an overt nature. Visiting Washington in 1981, Nakasone declared the intention of the government he heads to transform the country into an "unsinkable aircraft carrier." In subsequent years he has energetically brought this declaration to life, using as a pretext to cover his policy of militarization the myth of a "threat" on the part of the USSR.

At the same time, debates on the "common destiny" of Japan and the Asian countries and the necessity of creating such political and economic structures in the region that would make it possible to combine and rationally utilize the material, technical and other resources that they have "in the common interest" with a regard for their "specific Asian nature" began to appear more and more frequently in one form or another in the speeches of Japanese leaders and in the Japanese press.

It should be noted that this theory and the ideas of the "specific interests" of the Asian countries, their "special way of thinking" and traditions and the "special role" of Japan in Asia associated with them, were earlier mentioned frequently in the statements of nationalistically inclined Japanese leaders. "Japan has taken upon itself the new task of reinforcing the unity of the free camp in Asia," asserted then-Prime Minister Ikeda as early as 1963. "It is always ready to fulfill its leading role." In 1965 another Japanese leader, E. Sato, pointing out the "special role" of Japan in Asia, declared: "Being an Asian nation, Japan better knows the heart of the Asian peoples and the aspirations and hopes of the great continent." In August of 1977, speaking at a conference of heads of state of the ASEAN countries in Kuala Lumpur, Prime Minister Fukuda set forth the principles of Japanese policy in Asia that have since received the name of "the Fukuda Doctrine." He especially emphasized the "common spiritual interests" of Japan and the

countries in the association. "I call for the heartfelt mutual understanding of the peoples of Japan and the states of Southeast Asia," said Fukuda. "As Asians, you understand what I have in mind, since our Asian traditions and our Asian hearts are answered more not by searching for the satisfaction of material needs, but a desire for spiritual perfection." He promised the ASEAN countries credit in the amount of a billion dollars "on favorable terms" over the course of five years and another billion dollars in the form of economic aid.

It is true that "pan-Asian" terminology, always reflecting the substance and goals of the theory of the "common destiny" of Japan and the developing countries of Asia, is today almost completely lacking in the speeches of its advocates. And this is understandable: Japan is the junior partner and military ally of "white" American imperialism, against which its rulers called upon the Asian countries to wage irreconcilable war against in the 1940s. Today the advocates and propagandists of this theory prefer to speak of the "specific nature of conditions in Asia," of the special way of life and thought of the Asians, not always accessible to the understanding of the person from the West, of the religious traditions and cultural values of the countries in the region, in which Japan, as the most developed Asian power, has the most important role.

With the coming to power of the cabinet of Y. Nakasone, well-known for his militaristic and nationalistic convictions, the pretensions of Tokyo to a special position on the Asian continent have come to be displayed more and more obviously. S. Abe, the former minister of foreign affairs in this cabinet, declared that "Japan must fulfill in Asia the role and the obligations that correspond to its capabilities as the second most powerful state in the capitalist world, as well as raise its international status."

Nakasone himself, emphasizing his loyalty to the United States and the states of Western Europe and his readiness to accelerate the militarization of the country, which Washington is insisting on first of all, lets slip no opportunity to point out the "special position" of Japan both in Asia and in the "community of the Western powers" since while preserving its faith in the ideals of the West, it is indissolubly linked with Asia. He points out Japan's dependence on the markets and raw-material sources of the developing countries in the region, whose needs Tokyo supposedly knows well, and the "right and duty" of Tokyo that arises therein of "representing and defending" the interests of these states in the meetings of Japanese leaders with the leaders of the United States and the other countries of the "Western world." In particular, at conferences of the "Big Seven" Nakasone tried to represent himself as the head of state of the "sole Asian economic superpower," ready to take upon himself the representations of the developing countries of Asia.

"At the conference of the 'seven' in London in 1984, Nakasone intended to come forward as the intermediary among Western Europe, the United States and Asia, in

the role of the representative of the countries of that region," wrote the NIHON KEYJAI in May of that same year. "But incalling for a regard for the interests of the Asian states, especially ASEAN, he proposed nothing concrete. Nakasone," continued the newspaper, "loves to speak of 'solidarity among the Asian countries,' 'the preservation of the Asian legacy,' 'the creation of Asian values,' that 'Japan, opening up to the whole world, puts Asia at the vanguard of the future' and the like."

However much the Japanese nationalists try to hide their hegemonist aspirations and their growing pretensions to a special place for Japan in Asia behind flowery prose, however, these pretensions are obvious. "Japan and the countries of ASEAN have a common destiny," asserts M. Fujio, a representative of the political committee of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party. "Southeast Asia serves as a kind of 'back door' for Japan." In his opinion, Japan should continue to defend the theory of a "union of Asian countries" under its leadership, taking into account the dawning of the "Asian-Pacific century."

The persistent striving of Japanese nationalists to galvanize the theory of a "common destiny" for Japan and the other countries of the region is acquiring a more and more openly hegemonist and warlike thrust. Even the financial, economic and technical aid rendered by Tokyo pursues not only the aim of ensuring the most favorable trade terms for itself and the receipt of industrial raw materials, but definite political and military goals as well. "Whereas before," wrote the newspaper MAYNITI in this regard, "our country, when rendering aid, made stimulating expansion and ensuring sources of raw materials its chief tasks, in recent years political and even military motives for rendering this assistance are calling attention to themselves."

Naturally, under the conditions of the existing military and political dependence of Japan itself on the United States, such activity is ultimately subordinated first and foremost to reinforcing the position of Washington in the region. This is evoking a growing sense of dissatisfaction among the Japanese nationalists. It is true that it is sometimes expressed in guarded fashion. It is, however, being sounded more and more loudly to the extent that the economic and technical might of Japan and its influence on the world stage increase. "The inclusion of Japan in a system whose leadership, in accordance with a 'security treaty,' belongs to the United States," wrote the journal TYUO KORON, "has arisen from Japan's weakness and its position as a peripheral power with a low level of civilization. This disposition of forces has already ceased to correspond to the level of development of contemporary Japan."

The strengthening of dissatisfaction with U.S. policy in Japan and the dissemination of anti-American sentiments is causing growing alarm in Washington. Naturally, they have not forgotten the "anti-white" and anti-American thrust of Japanese "pan-Asianism" and do not want to see it resurrected, toward which the Japanese

advocates of the theory of a "common destiny" of Japan with the developing countries of Asia are secretly striving. And this alarm is manifested in the policies of Washington. It is typical that when Tokyo in 1979 came forward with an initiative to create a so-called Pacific Community with the participation of Japan, the ASEAN countries, South Korea, the United States, Australia and New Zealand, the reaction of Washington to this step was definitely negative. It was decided therein that in the community proposed by Japan it would be able to head up the Asian group of states, which would strengthen its position considerably in relations with the United States. Tokyo's initiative "twisted in the wind," and one of the reasons for that was Washington's "cool" attitude toward it.

A simple negative reaction to the Japanese proposal, however, was also not in the plans of the White House. This would complicate the already difficult relations with Japan, not to mention the fact that it deprived the United States of the opportunity to try and reinforce its own economic, military and political position in the Asian Pacific region, using of the Pacific Community for this in the event it was created.

As a result of many years of backroom Japanese-American negotiations, a new approach to the issue of forming the community was thus devised. The parties agreed that it should serve the interests of both Japan and the United States, whose ruling circles saw in it not only the opportunity of realizing their expansionist designs in the region, but also prospects for weakening existing and potential contradictions among the two powers. In January of 1985, at the negotiations between Reagan and Nakasone, it was decided to combine the efforts of the two countries for the purpose of forming the aforementioned group, after which various departments in the United States and Japan were seized, in the expression of observers, by a "Pacific boom." Councils on the Pacific Community were created in Washington and Tokyo that were to prepare the "practical basis" for its formation. Some of the leading organizations of Japanese and American big business were also included in this work.

They are just as far from the formation of the community, however, as they were in January of 1985. And the chief impediment herein is the reluctance of the developing countries, and first and foremost the ASEAN member countries, to be in even greater economic, military and political dependence on the United States and Japan, which would be the inevitable consequence of their entry into this group. Also hindering its formation is the presence of profound contradictions among all of its potential participants, and first and foremost the United States and Japan.

The plans of the White House to weaken the anti-American thrust of the growing nationalism in Japan via joint efforts in the creation of the community, which

would bind that country to the Pacific strategy of the United States, were unfounded. But steps in that direction are being undertaken with the former energy.

Regardless of whether Washington and Tokyo find a "common language" on this issue or whether the neocolonial policy they are conducting in Asia is implemented under the conditions of a further worsening in the inter-imperialist contradictions, the threat to the sovereignty and security of the developing countries in the region on the part of the two imperialist pretenders to the affirmation of their dominion here will in any case grow stronger.

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12821

#### Book on Chinese-Japanese Economic Cooperation Reviewed

18070401f Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA  
in Russian No 7, Jul 87 p 62

[Review by A. Osipov titled "The Economic Collaboration of the PRC and Japan" of book "Yaponiya—KNP: mekhanizm ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva" [Japan and the PRC: The Mechanism of Economic Collaboration] by M.I. Krupyanko. Moscow, Oriental Literature Section of Nauka Publishing House, 1986, 181 pp]

[Text] Japan and China are two major Asian powers whose political and economic relations have followed an extremely complex and contradictory path in the post-war period—from hostility and lack of diplomatic recognition in the 1950s and 1960s to rapid convergence in the 1970s and 1980s. The interest that Soviet readers are displaying in the contemporary state of Japanese-Chinese ties in various realms and the prospects for their further development thus seems natural.

This book, using rich factual material, uncovers the interconnection among the political interests of the ruling circles in Japan in the direction of China and the efforts to make use of the mechanism of economic collaboration to achieve them. Krupyanko researches the essence of the strategy of contemporary Japanese imperialism in relation to socialist countries based on the example of China. The principal tools of Japanese "economic diplomacy" in China are analyzed.

The virtue of the book is the attempt of the author to investigate the causes for the dynamic development of Japanese-Chinese relations in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. As a matter of fact, over a relatively short period of time—from the moment of the normalization of bilateral ties in 1972 through current times—the amount of trade between socialist China and capitalist Japan has increased from 1.1 to 19 billion dollars, that is, by over 17 times. The PRC has become second to the

United States of America in market significance for Japanese exports, and sixth in imports. Deliveries of various types of machinery and equipment, as well as domestic electronics, from Japan to China have increased especially quickly.

After several years of cautious temporizing, Japanese investors have entered into long-term capital investments in the Chinese market: about 70 Japanese-Chinese joint enterprises were functioning on PRC territory in the middle of the 1980s, whereas at the beginning of the decade they had barely numbered ten. Ties in the realm of science and technology are also being actively developed. Japan is making an ever more noticeable contribution to the training of Chinese specialists at higher and secondary educational institutions. China is receiving Japanese assistance in the technical modernization and retooling of its industrial enterprises.

In the author's opinion, an important role belongs to the active use by the Japanese of the mechanism of "private diplomacy," in addition to the traditional factors that are facilitating the appreciable acceleration and convergence of the two countries in the realm of trade and economics such as geographical proximity, the mutually complementary nature of trade patterns, cultural commonality and, finally, the policies pursued by the Chinese leaders since the end of the 1970s. He proposes the active formation in China of close personal contacts between the employees of Japanese firms and official representatives of Chinese state institutions. This mechanism, extremely effective during the period when official relations were lacking between Japan and China in the 1950s and 1960s, has not lost its significance today. The use by Japanese businessmen of their contacts in China allows them to regulate the scale of trade between the two countries quite freely and flexibly today.

The author comes to the conclusion that the ruling circles of Japan will make every possible effort within the framework of "economic diplomacy" to preserve the position of chief trading partner of China for itself among the leading capitalist countries in the future as well. It ties its plans in relation to the use of the Chinese market with the quite high vested interest of the Chinese in collaborating with Japan, whose economy, as opposed to the United States and the EEC, is less subject to competitive market declines and develops at a more stable rate, which allows the Chinese leadership not to fear a possible sharp strengthening of protectionism against its rapidly expanding exports.

It should also be mentioned that the book, from my point of view, devotes insufficient attention to analyzing the future prospects of Japanese-Chinese relations. In the face of all the apparent difficulties of

forecasting—and this is explained both by the uncertainty of evaluations of the socio-economic development of Japanese capitalism, which is suffering serious difficulties, and the known problems in implementing modernization programs in the Chinese economy—it nonetheless seems important and desirable to acquaint the reader with the opinions of specialists on the future paths of development in Japanese-Chinese relations.

This book gives a faithful depiction overall of the contemporary state of relations between these two countries and the problems that exist.

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**Book Describing Fate of Palestinians Reviewed**  
18070401g Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 7, Jul 87 pp 62-63

[Review by Candidate of Historical Sciences V. Kisilev titled "The Palestinian Tragedy" of book "Palestinskaya tragediya" [The Palestinian Tragedy] by Ye. Dmitriyev. Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya Publishing House, 1986, 157 pp]

[Text] The tragic fate of the Arab people of Palestine, from whom the Israeli usurpers have taken their motherland, has become the topic of steadfast attention for Soviet Oriental and Arab scholar Ye. Dmitriyev. In his monograph he reviews the history of the appearance of the Palestinian problem and analyzes several aspects of it: political, legal, territorial and economic.

The author justly sees the cause of the appearance of the Palestinian tragedy in the colonial policies of the Western powers in the Near East and the Zionist colonization of Palestine that was carried out under the patronage of Great Britain and the approval of the United States. The book emphasizes that long before the formation of the state of Israel on the territory of Palestine (May of 1948), the World Zionist Organization and other international centers of Zionism came forward as the active pursuers of and co-participants in the colonial expansion of the Western powers in the Near East.

The book analyzes in detail the specific features of the policies of the United States on the Palestinian issue and a Near-East settlement. Dmitriyev shows that Israel can pursue its aggressive expansionist course against the Arab people of Palestine and the Arab world overall only thanks to American support.

A central place in the book is occupied with illuminating the current struggle of the Palestinians for their rights. Tracing the formation of the Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM) and its political vanguard—the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)—step by step, the author notes that the PRM has been transformed into an active factor in the anti-imperialist struggle, while the Palestinian problem has become the "connecting link" for a possible unification of the Arab states against the American-Israeli hegemonist actions in the Near East. At the same time, the activity of the PRM and the PLO is reviewed in the book in the dynamics of their development, without neglecting the difficulties and contradictions that are characteristic of the Palestinian Liberation movement and its individual detachments.

Dmitriev sets forth in quite a bit of detail the position of the USSR on the Palestinian problem. The principled and consistent course of the Soviet Union in defense of the rights of the Palestinian people is embodied in the concrete political initiatives of the Soviet government aimed at a political settlement of the Near-East crisis and its core—the Palestinian problem. A comprehensive analysis of these initiatives shows that the proposals of the USSR correspond to the national interests of the Palestinians and the task of establishing a lasting and just peace in the Near East. In the opinion of the Soviet Union, under the conditions currently extant in the region, the path to such a peace passes through an international conference on the Near East with the participation of all parties with a vested interest, including the PLO as the sole legal representative of the Palestinian people.

The analysis of the history and contemporary state of the Palestinian problem given by the Soviet scholar in this book largely expands our perceptions of the complex fate of the Palestinian people and the difficulties of their struggle for liberation from Israeli occupation and for national independence.

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**Book on U.S. China Policy from Missionary Movement to Present**  
18070401h Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 7, Jul 87 p 63

[Review by Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu. Melnikov titled "U.S. Policies in Relation to China" of book "Missionary i ikh nasledniki. Povoroty politiki SShA v otnoshenii Kitaya" [The Missionaries and their Descendants. The Turns of United States Policy in Relation to China] by V. B. Vorontsov. Moscow, Politicheskaya Literatura Publishing House, 1986, 240 pp]

[Text] The new book of Soviet historian V. Vorontsov is written in the genre of a scholarly-popular sketch. The author begins his work with the history of the penetration of the first American missionaries into China and their activity there and expands on it in researching the policies of the United States in relation to the PRC.

The book justly notes the "complex dialectic of the missionary movement" of the Americans in China. "Among the fighters for the dissemination of the Gospels were also people," writes the author, "that more than once risked their lives in hostile surroundings. They were ready, on the one hand, to treat children for cholera, putting their own lives at risk by doing this... But on the other hand, they could approve of perfidy and cruelty by foreign troops on Chinese soil, assuming at the same time that the blood of the pagans 'was shed for a sacred cause'" (pp 230-231). And the more so as the "civilizing mission" in U.S. policy toward China concealed its basic expansionist and reactionary substance. From opium trade to wars, the doctrines of "open doors" and "equal opportunities" to the export of counter-revolution and the American capitalist way of life—such, as the book shows, were the sometimes quite sharp twists to these policies.

Of much interest in particular are those sections of the book which describe the mutual relations of the Americans with the Kuomintang regime in the years of the Second World War and the subsequent revolutionary upheaval in China. The more realistically and liberally thinking "descendants of the missionaries" in the United States saw all of the rottenness and venality of the Chiang Kaishek clique and understood the lack of prospects in betting on it, but the upper hand in American politics was held for many years by those circles that "refused to deal with communism," acknowledge the victory of the popular revolution in China and reconcile themselves to Soviet-Chinese collaboration.

The book reveals the reasons that ultimately pushed the ruling circles in the United States to recognize the PRC, establish diplomatic relations and develop economic, scientific, technical and even military ties with it. "The dialectic of the capitalist world strategy," the author emphasizes, "became clearer in American foreign policy, as the more the political positions of monopoly capital fell apart, the more refined the actions of the opponents of socialism aimed at splitting and undermining those opposed to policies of dictate by force became. On this plane, the 'China factor' acquired especial topicality for the rulers of America" (p 168).

In trying to use the "China card" to this or that extent to pressure the USSR or even for direct confrontation with it, the state figures of the United States did not and do not, however, have the intention of fully recognizing the legitimate national interests and

rights of the PRC, rendering it effective and unselfish assistance in modernizing its economy and the like. This is demonstrated most clearly in the issue of the re-unification of Taiwan with China. In reviewing all of the U.S. maneuvers with Taiwan, the author comes to the conclusion that Washington in fact has always sabotaged and is sabotaging the re-unification of this territory, part of China since time immemorial, with the PRC.

The book also contains certain shortcomings and inconsistencies. The author, for example, only mentions but does not cover to a sufficient extent the "open doors" doctrine and policy associated with

China. It would have been desirable to illuminate in detail the position of the PRC before and during the Second World War on issues of the anti-imperialist struggle.

Vorontsov's research, which contains interesting material, should attract not only the attention of specialists, but of a wide circle of readers that are interested in American-Chinese and international relations as well.

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**Soviet-U.S. Telebridge on Human Rights**

08181047 Moscow Television Service  
in Russian 0330 GMT 15 Oct 87

[Third telebridge of the series "New Thinking in the Nuclear Age," moderated by Leonid Zolotarevskiy, USSR State Television and Radio, and Peter Jennings, ABC Television Network; live linkup between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the U.S. Congress—all comments by Americans in English with superimposed Russian translation]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted on introductory remarks]

[Zolotarevskiy] Good morning, comrades. We are opening another program in a series of telebridges linking the USSR Supreme Soviet and the U.S. Congress. A short introduction has already been done. On the Soviet side Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin, first deputy chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee; and Ivan Dmitriyevich Laptev, editor in chief of *Izvestiya* are taking part in the discussion [video shows Zagladin and Laptev] USSR Supreme Soviet deputies; a U.S. Embassy representative—whom I am happy to greet here at this telebridge—and representatives of the Soviet and foreign press have gathered here.

The rules of our program are as follows: Do not be surprised when approximately every 10 minutes there is a break for U.S. commercials. This is a condition stipulated by the ABC television network which is broadcasting the program, and you will be watching the same things Americans will be watching, i.e. the same U.S. commercials. As for the rest, the discussion will take place in the usual way and let us hope that it is fruitful.

[Jennings, visible on the screen in a long shot of the Soviet studio] [passage omitted] Good evening, Leonid. I am pleased to see you. There was a lively response in our country after our first program. What reaction was there in the Soviet Union?

[Zolotarevskiy] Good morning, Peter. I am pleased to see you too. We had a fairly lively reaction too. Many journals, newspapers, and magazines wrote about that program; photographs were published and there were many responses from viewers. So, great interest is being shown. I suppose that as we discuss more new problems this interest will grow.

[Jennings] Okay, Leonid. As you know, today we regard the problem under consideration as an extremely important one and we will begin this discussion in a few moments. U.S. and Soviet viewers will have the opportunity to speak with each other thanks to a large group of interpreters. Leonid and I have prepared a number of reports which will show how each society views the issue of human rights. We will also discuss the changes taking place in the Soviet Union and the changes that are yet to take place. We will start with Leonid and the Soviet point of view.

[Caption in English: "From the Soviet Union." A Soviet film is shown on the screen starting with a shot of pages from the Soviet Constitution, then Soviet crowds on the street] [Unidentified announcer] A week ago we marked the 10th anniversary of the new USSR Constitution. It guarantees broad rights in areas of life for Soviet citizens. The Soviet concept of human rights is the unity of social, political, civil, and individual rights. Ensuring these rights is a subject of constant attention by the USSR Supreme Soviet, which is the supreme body of legislative authority in the USSR. We can state with satisfaction that we have attained a good deal of success in the practical realization of human rights. All Soviets enjoy the rights to work, education, medical care, material provision for the elderly and the sick, and vacations. Soviet people may take part in elections and be elected to governmental bodies; they have the right to join social, professional, cooperative, and other organizations. Soviet citizens enjoy the protection of law; they can express freely their thoughts. They can criticize the activity of state and party bodies and their leaders by means of the media or other forms of democratic procedure.

[Video cuts to people demonstrating outside the White House, a courtroom, civilian airliner taking off, a young man speaking at a microphone, people praying in a church, slums, street crowds, the Statue of Liberty. Caption reads: "This footage has been prepared by the ABC television network"]

[Second unidentified announcer] These people outside the White House are demonstrating against U.S. Administration policy in South Africa. This is freedom of speech one of the rights to which, in their opinion, all people are entitled to, in action. Americans think that a person has the right to be protected against arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, the right to go wherever and whenever he wants, the right to read or to write any books, the right to pray or not. The United States teaches its citizens to recognize any kind of injustice and to understand that there is injustice in their own country. They are also taught to think about what each of them could do to change such a situation. Human rights is the main theme of the U.S. historical experience. In sum, our country is a nation of immigrants where in an overwhelming majority we—or our forefathers—came seeking freedom and human rights, which are inseparable from it.

[Video cuts back to a page from the USSR Constitution, street crowds]

[First announcer] We do not think that the problems related to human rights have been solved completely in our country. Special features and unjustified subjective decisions have led, in the past, to their limitation or violation. Cases of this sort occur in our time too.

[Video shows a uniformed man in a room; caption reads: "Vladimir Andreyev, collegium member of the USSR Procuracy"]

[Andreyev] Until recently we have had more than just isolated violations of political, labor, housing and other rights of citizens. Currently we are trying to get to the point where local public prosecutors can effectively carry out total legal supervision in the country; they will not give in to any local pressure but will strictly supervise the rigorous observation of citizens' rights.

[Video shows street crowds, then pages from OGON-YOK magazine featuring articles on journalist Mikhail Koltsov and Pasternak]

[First announcer] The democratization process that started 2 years ago is leading to the comprehensive strengthening of legality and the development of the people's initiative. Soviet newspapers and magazines mirror the restructuring process. Varied and sometimes opposite points of view are published freely in them.

[Video shows a crowd, a speaker at a monument; caption reads: "Vilnius, 23 August 1987"] The right to hold rallies and demonstrations, even if they are at variance with commonly accepted notions and acknowledged values, is being freely implemented.

[Video shows civilian airliner taking off] today we enjoy much greater freedom of movement. Millions of our compatriots go abroad each year on business trips, either as tourists or at private invitations.

[Video shows a man in a suit and tie; caption reads: "Rudolf Kuznetsov, chief of a USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs department"] [Kuznetsov] Today the procedures for entering and leaving the USSR have been simplified. Since then [timeframe unidentified], over 16,000 individuals have received permission to leave the USSR in order to live abroad permanently and this is 3 times as many as in all of 1986. Former Soviet citizens residing abroad have been allowed to visit the USSR. These processes are in a dynamic state. Work is being done to simplify these procedures and remove all kinds of formalities which will make it possible to expand contacts between Soviet citizens and their foreign friends and relatives even more.

[Video cuts back to a page of the USSR Constitution and then shows a church interior and people in prayer]

[First announcer] Our Constitution guarantees freedom of religion. Although church and state are separate in the USSR and schools are run by the state, churches, mosques, synagogues, and houses of prayer function freely in towns and villages and new ones are being opened.

[Video shows part of a page of the USSR Constitution, a staff meeting, ballots being counted, a meeting in a hall]

[First announcer] The democratization process embraces all levels of state management, from improving electoral system, to free elections of managers of enterprises and institutions.

[Third unidentified announcer] [Video shows people walking in Red Square in front of the Vasilyevskiy Sobor] Any reports that Soviet people have greater opportunities for more freely expressing their thoughts are received with joy by Americans.

[Video shows middle-aged American woman speaking in English, fading into Russian translation] As people devoted to freedom in all its aspects, we care about human rights and [words indistinct] for a citizen of any country.

[Video shows Dr Sakharov and Yelena Bonner walking in a street, then Sakharov surrounded by photographers; Shcharanskiy is shown mounting a platform at a meeting in Israel; a demonstration is shown with demonstrators being impeded by young men, and a woman says: I want to go to Israel! caption in Russian reads: "These clips were provided by ABC television"]

[Third Announcer] Americans rejoiced [word indistinct] when Andrey Sakharov and Yelene Bonner no longer appeared only in films taken by the KGB, taken during their exile in Gorkiy, and were free in Moscow again; when Anatoliy Shcharanskiy was released from prison and obtained permission to emigrate, Americans began to entertain new hopes. However, Americans do not understand why your government does not allow people like [words indistinct] like the grandfather and grandmother of Leonid Friedman. [Video shows black and white still picture of elderly couple] These people have been trying to obtain visas for 10 years.

[Video shows young bearded man talking in front of bookshelves] The official pretext for holding them is that my grandfather was allegedly employed on secret work. However, he is not an Army general or a nuclear physicist. All his life has been employed in manual labor in a factory. [Video shows cars in front of a building, then different bearded man in chair, holding photos of buildings]

[Third announcer] Certain decisions of your government, from the U.S. point of view, are quite unacceptable. For instance, political dissidence has been characterised as a psychiatric illness. Viktor Davydov was accused of slandering the Soviet state and sent to a psychiatric hospital. After he left the Soviet Union in 1984, he was examined by two U.S. psychiatrists and one British, and none of them found any signs at all of any mental disturbance.

[Video shows ABC credit repeated over still photos of male faces, then brief clip of two men talking in front of Izvestiya display board] [Third announcer] International human rights organizations have established over 100

instances of Soviet citizens being detained in psychiatric hospitals for their political views. We greatly welcome reports that the Soviet press is now investigating these practices. Your reforms are welcomed in the West. [Video shows another bearded man being interviewed] For exposing activities on the Soviet black market, Lev Timofeyev was sent to prison, but was recently pardoned. He returned to Moscow. He says he is very much in favor of glasnost, but he still (has forebodings). We only have one guarantee of freedom, namely the fair words of the general secretary. But who knows what he will say tomorrow? [rapid succession of brief video clips of street scenes, play on stage, and people rowing on river]

[Excerpts] [Third Announcer continues] Although Americans are encouraged by the events of recent years, their belief that things are getting better is still not settled. They sincerely hope for more opportunities for writers to be published, for greater freedom of activity for those involved in films and plays. Greater actual freedom of opinion in all spheres would draw our countries closer together and would make the whole world a calmer place to live in. [Video shows elderly man, first walking past Newman Laboratory building, then close-up of same man speaking in Russian] This thought was expressed simply by one of your well-known scientists, now let out of a Soviet prison and teaching in the West.

[Unidentified elderly man] I would like to say to them that there is no need to be afraid of more radical reforms. They will not destroy the system which is so dear to them, they will only strengthen it.

[Jennings] That was our program and now let us return to our discussion. As you know, Leonid, we are hearing a lot just now about glasnost, and one of the questions we would like to explore is the following. Does glasnost give Soviet citizens the opportunity or the right to express their opinions? I believe that there is a great difference here between opportunity and right. I hope we can discuss this frankly where we return to our program. [passage omitted on commercial break]

[Jennings] The first program, which we put out several weeks ago, was begun by me, but now it is Leonid Zolotarevskiy's turn in Moscow. Go ahead please, Leonid.

[Zolotarevskiy] Thanks, Peter. [passage omitted on background] Let us pay attention to one another; let us not, as it were, conceal anything from one another but let us discuss the general problems and the general questions which should yield a positive result from this discussion. Vadim Valentinovich, perhaps you should begin.

[Zagladin] All right, with pleasure. In the first place, I would like to extend cordial greetings to Senator Moynihan, whom we met in Moscow quite recently, and Congressman Hoyer, we also met in Moscow quite recently. At that time, we had good discussions and I

think we will now have a good conversation. Senator, I would first like to say that I watched the feature, or, rather, both features, to be exact with interest. I do not totally agree with Leonid Zolotarevskiy, since it is clear from these features and, particularly, from the advertisements, that we have problems in common, alcoholism, for instance. I think we will yet have time to talk about common problems. Now, however, I would like to say, Senator, that unfortunately your feature has already become somewhat obsolete—or maybe fortunately so—since the Friedman couple was shown in it, two people allegedly prevented from leaving. Indeed, for a long time they were unable to leave, but now they have been given permission to leave and they can join their relatives in the United States. So far as this bit is concerned, your feature is obsolete. This is not bad, but it is a good thing.

[Jennings] Mr Zagladin, allow me to interrupt you, allow me to butt in. I apologize, but do you really mean to tell us that Friedman's parents are about to leave? This is the first we have heard about it here in the United States.

[Zagladin] Peter, you have understood me perfectly correctly.

[Jennings] Very well, they will be pleased to learn about it. Please continue.

[Zagladin] Senator and Mr Hoyer, I would like to continue in this way. In general, I myself asked to participate in this broadcast, knowing in the first place who our partners on the U.S. side were to be and, in the second place, of course, taking into account the importance of the subject matter. I think that the subject of human rights is a great subject of the present time. We attach very great significance to it, both as far as the global dimension and as far as our own country are concerned since—and I think Congressman Hoyer spoke of this during his last visit in the USSR—there is no ideal situation anywhere, neither in the United States nor in our country. We do not consider the situation in our country to be ideal in this respect. There are problems. These are various problems, of varying magnitude, varying scale, and varying nature; but there are also common problems. So, it is very interesting and important to discuss them. Our communist and soviet programmatic task is to comprehensively develop the individual. It is understandable that at various stages of social development this task has been tackled in different ways and has sometimes been understood differently. Now we have a period of restructuring, and I understood from what Peter Jennings said that this theme is of interest to you. Well, we will be pleased to let you in on what is going on in our country. We will answer your questions and of course we will have some for you, too, because, I repeat, we have problems in common, and we have our own interest in what is going on in the United States. That is what I wanted to say in the beginning. [Jennings] It is very nice to hear your voice. Perhaps Senator Moynihan will reply or ask a question himself?

[Moynihan] I agree with you; there are no ideal situations, neither in your country nor in ours. However, there are situations which are better or worse. You know very well that for the greater part of the century the Soviet Union was a hell for human rights. After all, you have not even returned to the times of the tsarist empire. Under the tsar, there was free emigration; everyone could leave without asking the permission of the commissars. Under the tsar, the Ukrainian Catholic Church was open, not an underground church. Under the tsar, PRAVDA was sold on the streets of Moscow. Just try to find an opposition newspaper in the Soviet Union now, 70 years after the revolution.

[Zagladin] Senator, I cannot congratulate you very much on your comparison with Tsarist Russia. In my opinion, it is dishonest on your part, and the main things is that it is completely untrue. Of course, it is true that tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands of people emigrated—poor, homeless, starving, dying of starvation—that is true. Since then we no longer have such people; we have no starving, no poor, no homeless. Everyone in our country has the right and the opportunity to work and to receive the corresponding wages. There is a right to work; all this has been talked about. In 70 years we have done more than any other country; this is a historical fact and there can be no discussion about it. I would also like to say something else: In what you said I see a confirmation of the obvious fact that in discussing human rights we inevitably come up against one big problem, one I would call a difference of views, a difference in our systems. Indeed, our concepts of human rights differ and many things which we see in one way, you see in another way. Many human rights which apparently exist in both countries are approached in completely different ways.

Let us, for instance, take political rights, elections. In both our countries everyone has a right to take part in elections; but in your country a person who wants to be elected, or should be elected, must spend hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars for this purpose. He either has to raise this money or else use his own money. This already places everyone in a situation in which they are not equal. I mean, the right apparently exists, but it apparently does not exist for a certain category, for the majority. When our deputies are elected it is society that bears all the costs. That is to say the right is identical, but it is treated and it operates in different ways. The same goes for the right to work. You recognize the right to choose your own occupation and this is official in your country. Well, this is good. But the right to choose your occupation is not tantamount to people being able to get work; it does not mean that it is guaranteed by society. However, we have both. Again, it would appear that the right does exist, the same right, but we understand it in different ways. I could give other examples here.

[Jennings] Mr Zagladin, perhaps when we return we can ask Congressman Hoyer to have a say. He had a great many meetings with Soviet representatives. Apparently there are a number of laws the USSR would like ...

as its own, as distinct from the United States. We will be back in a moment. [passage omitted: commercial break; ABC's explanation, illustrated by video, of complex technical arrangements for telebridge]

[Jennings] As is often the case, the Soviet authorities frequently make timely announcements of political events. For instance, we have just been told that the Frideman family will be able to reunite. As far as we know, several other events have taken place in the USSR. It would be interesting to know whether the Soviet people know this. Vladimir Shlepak, it is 17 years since he applied to leave. He has now been told that he and his wife can go. He was a member of the group that monitors the Helsinki accords and he has spent a considerable part of the past 17 years in exile. One more person: Vladimir Titov, who has spent a lot of time in a psychiatric hospital. He has also now been told he can go. He was accused of providing information about the situation of political prisoners. Congressman Hoyer:

[Hoyer] I would like to continue the subject begun by Mr Zagladin, since relatives of three people, who have been waiting for an announcement of this kind for a long time were in this hall with Ambassador Dobrynin and in our presence and U.S. citizens would have had a much better opinion of the USSR and your human rights discussion had Yuriy Balavlenkov been included in this list, if Viktor Fidmak had been included in this list or if Leonid Chernyy had been included in this list of persons permitted to leave. [sentence as heard]

I can name hundreds of other people from the lists I gave you and other people in the USSR during our meetings. I would like to suggest that there is not such a great difference in our views on human rights—in the Final Act we said that these rights stem from the dignity of the individual as a human being—Soviet citizens, Ukrainians, the inhabitants of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, U.S. citizens, UK citizens—and this dignity of people is based on their fundamental rights. And we in the United States reckon—as has been said during the discussion of the arms control problems and with which Mr Tolkunov agreed—that if there is greater understanding between us there will also be more cooperation.

We have to observe the Helsinki agreements, which show how we treat our citizens. This will be a test of trust. Mr Zagladin was talking about trust and partnership. The U.S. public wants this. We want the world to be more stable and safe. This is the goal of the Helsinki Final Act. We hope, however, that you will let people leave, those people who want to use their right to be reunited with their relatives, and live in a country where they want to live. We believe that this was promised at Helsinki. President Ford said, and I agree with it, and you think you agree as well, that the promises given in Helsinki are fine, but the test of how this is carried out will be the conduct of the Soviet Union, the United States, and other states.

[Jennings] Mr Hoyer, and our esteemed presenter of the program, it seems that our conversation is going somewhat along a line that is advantageous first for the one side and then for the other. Wouldn't it be possible, nonetheless, to talk about more general things, wouldn't it be possible to move away from the position of citing individual facts to one another; the position of discussing in what context we are examining all these rights, how some cases or other are decided, and what the correlation is between the decision on every case and the law. I think that one can cite many different facts from both sides, and there are such data, undoubtedly in your country and over here. However, at the same time, every time we answer your question about why we do not allow someone to leave, and every time such a matter is resolved on the basis of Soviet law and on studying all the circumstances, and simply a declaration that this person wants to leave or does not want to leave the country, left or did not leave, such a declaration as a rule does not achieve anything. It seems to me that our program and our conversation will be more productive if we have a look at how the whole system of human rights fits in, how this system of human rights corresponds to the country's possibilities, and its constitutional structure, to its laws and traditions and the view and opinion of the majority. I think that one should go along this path here, and if you accept such a suggestion, we could simply propose a suitable sequence for the discussion.

[Jennings] Mr Laptev, Mr Laptev, I'm sorry but from the U.S. point of view, it seems to us, you are overstating your point a bit. We do have a whole range of common factors, but we should like to know very much what law you are talking about, and what part of the Soviet constitution forbids Soviet people from travelling abroad where they wish. Americans cannot comprehend this. Please explain this in greater detail, please.

[Zolotarevskiy] Excuse me for putting a word in here. Vadim Valentinovich will answer your questions in a minute, of course. I just want to express concern once again at the way that the discussion is progressing, the same concern that was voiced at the beginning. You know, I cannot help recall the fact in all this, for instance, that the U.S. Congress receives an annual report from the State Department on observance of human rights in 167 countries, but does not receive a report about the observance of human rights in the United States. If we begin to expand on this topic at the moment our conversation will hardly be very fruitful. I apologise for interrupting the discussion. Vadim Valentinovich, over to you. [Zagladin] I don't agree with Leonid Zolotarevskiy once again, because I am not worried about the course of the discussion. It seems interesting to me. I should like to return to what Steny Hoyer was saying. First of all, I agree with him that we have common, universal declarations on human rights and of course the Helsinki agreements, and there are many moral standards on which we do not disagree. So we do have things in common and that is a good basis. And now onto the specific matter of leaving the country that has been

touched upon. You know in the video features that you have been showing there was an interesting phrase. The United States is a nation of immigrants, or the Americans are a nation of immigrants. This is indeed so, and this explains largely your attitude to the problem of emigration as a whole. Our nation is not a nation of immigrants and historically, we have formed a specific attitude to the problem of emigration, because we have had two great waves of emigration, after the October revolution and after World War II. This involved in the one case people who took up arms and fought against the revolution, and in the other case people who supported the Hitlerites. Therefore, of course the people had a negative attitude to emigration. But that is changing. After the war the problem of reuniting families and mixed marriages arose, socialist countries appeared and we have different approaches, of course. Attitudes are changing. I shall say frankly, as a deputy I come up against cases where the local authorities refuse someone the right to leave the country, although there strictly speaking no reasons for this, and they refuse because the local population views this with extremely hostility, negatively, and so on. These cases are being rectified. But you should understand the psychological aspect of the matter. Now within restructuring we...

[Unidentified congressman, interrupting] Mr Zagladin...

[Zagladin] I am sorry, I wanted to finish, or is it time for the commercials?

[Congressman] No, no.

[Zagladin] I'll continue then, I'll continue then.

[Congressman] Please do.

[Zagladin] We have done a lot to simplify the procedures concerning exit from and entrance to the country. We have constitutional rights, the appropriate legislative norms that safeguard the exit and entry of our citizens. There's mainly one obstacle to gaining permission to leave the country and that is the problem of protecting state secrets. This problem exists everywhere, in all countries, including the United States. In this connection, it should be said that our rules and principles are evolving. Since the Berne meeting in 1986—unfortunately, the United States, although it took part in compiling the convention, refused to participate in it—but we took it as a guide for action, we even went further than what is written there and introduced new rules which considerably expanded the opportunities for exists and entries as compared with the past. Firstly, we now grant this right not only for close relatives...

[Jennings, interrupting] Mr Zagladin!

[Zagladin] Yes?

[Jennings] I don't want to go to a commercial, but a congressman present here would like to comment on your statement. If you have no objection, Congressman Clay Shaw of Florida would like to comment on your remarks.

[Zagladin] Certainly, but I haven't finished yet.

[Zolotarevskiy] I think we should first let Mr Zagladin finish, Peter.

[Unidentified congressman] I think the esteemed representatives of the Soviet Union will have the opportunity. Mr Zagladin will be able to complete his statement, but in the course of completing his statement, he could perhaps answer the question of one of my constituents, (Galina Veloshina), who is present here. She married [name indistinct]. We have been trying for many years to reunite the family. We have spoken to your ambassador in the United States, and we have at least opened the door a little in the last few weeks. We have received assurance that she can go to the Soviet Union to meet her husband, but we in the United States do not understand how it is possible to forbid a man to leave to be reunited with his wife in the United States. They have submitted such applications 17 times, and perhaps Mr Zagladin, since he is talking about this question, could touch on this case in particular.

[Jennings] Mr Zagladin, if you have understood the question, please continue.

[Zagladin] Yes, of course I understand. But I would just like to say first that I do not know this specific case; he is not my constituent, you understand, nor is she.

[Zolotarevskiy] Vadim Valentinovich, excuse me please, we have in our audience...

[Shepetis] But he is my constituent. I am a deputy from Lithuania. I believe it is a Lithuanian of whom we are speaking. It is a question of state secrets, so I have heard, about this question, and in my opinion, I think the applicant himself knows this, and his wife knows it too.

[Zolotarevskiy] Peter, this information was given by a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Shepetis, a deputy from the Lithuanian republic.

[Unidentified speaker] Well then, I would like...

[Zolotarevskiy interrupting] excuse me, Mr Zagladin has not finished yet.

[Hoyer] Mr Zagladin, I would like to ask a question, if I may. You were talking about state security, and a member of (your soviet) spoke about security. The person of whom we are speaking has been refused 17 times, each time with this reference to state security. Mr Gorbachev, in 1985 in France, said that state security and the danger to it normally has a duration of 5 years or, in exceptional

cases, 10 years. However, in most of the cases of which we are speaking, this has been going on for more than 10 years. Mr Gorbachev repeated in his talk with congressmen, when I was in Moscow and spoke with Gorbachev, he repeated that 5 years is the limit for citing grounds of security. Sometimes if you are apart for a year, you lose touch with secrets. We in the United States consider that the reference to security grounds does not stand up. If this reference to a 5-year limit really does exist, that would be fine. Could you confirm this?

[Zolotarevskiy] Peter, I beg your pardon. I'm afraid the esteemed gentlemen may again disagree with me, but I'll take that risk. You know, doesn't it seem to you that if we are going to discuss such specific cases, whether they relate to our practice or to your practice, we shall not clarify the main issue, you understand, because—well, all right, in the case in question we have been lucky; Deputy Shepetis happened to be in the audience, and he knew about this specific case. But if there are some other cases, we will probably really not know about them. By the way, you, Peter, at the very beginning, gave the Soviet viewers some new information, and I would also like to do this, to give some information which may be interesting. I will do this in order to dispose somehow of the problem of the so-called emigration. At present, there are 549 applications in the entire Soviet Union to leave and take up permanent abode in other countries. That is all, you know; so if you reckon this is a big problem, let us then discuss it as such; but if we discuss concrete cases, we shall not get far.

[Zagladin] In the first place, the figure is not 549, but somewhat more, the figure of 549 pertains to persons of Jewish nationality alone. I mean, probably the figure is around 800. But this is what I want to say: Mr. Hoyer is both right and wrong at the same time. He is not right in the sense that each country has its own laws and we cannot change them because a single individual or another state wants us to do so. Incidentally, the quote from Comrade Gorbachev was inexact: he spoke of 5 to 10 years and at times even more. I myself was there and that is why I remember it well. So, there are different state secrets and you have your variety, too; and, let us say this, there are various time limits before the documents can be declassified from "secret". In our country this is the process currently underway: We are reviewing some of these time limits. Now, each person who has been refused knows precisely how long his restriction will last. But the period can be reduced if the secrecy status of an enterprise, facility, or something else is reviewed. Now, since Congressman Hoyer spoke of the lists that have been handed over, I would simply like to inform our colleagues of the following: the lists given us last year, in most cases these people resolved their questions—incidentally, independently of these lists, not because the lists existed, but because the process of restructuring, of democratisation of society, is underway in our country.

[Zagladin continues] As far as these lists of last year are concerned, there were 51 cases where people did not

apply to leave. Naturally their applications were not considered. Eleven people refused to leave, although this opportunity was offered them.

This year another list was handed over, in April. I have the data here: 50 permissions have been given and in 8 cases, for reasons of secrecy, the applications have been turned down, for the time being but not in perpetuity, but just for the duration of the security restriction. A list of separated husbands and wives has been handed over.

[Jennings] Mr. Zagladin...

[Zagladin] Yes, but I am giving you information about your requests. In 12 cases, permission to leave was granted; the remaining ones are, for the time being under consideration. There was also a list of sick people requiring treatment: 16 people have left; 8 have not, as yet, been decided; 2 failed to apply. These are the data.

[Jennings] Mr. Zagladin, I want to interrupt you for a moment to say that our figures diverge. There is in our country a committee which monitors the observance of the Helsinki accords and it is of the opinion that the figure of 10,000 is at stake here, but we shall return to this question after our break. [passage omitted, commercial break]

[Zolotarevskiy] Before the commercial break, Congressman Hoyer gave the figure of 10,000. Mr Zagladin will comment on the figure, but in this connection, I would like to recall a similar figure, 10,000 which was given by a former deputy representative of the United States to the UN, Mr Young, who said that there were 10,000 political prisoners in the United States. Just look how the figures coincide. They do, don't they?

[Zagladin] Well, to start with I shall return to your figure. In the first 9 months of this year, 19,393 people here have gained permission to leave the Soviet Union according to the new rules that I have already spoken about. That is almost four times as many as last year. At the moment there are 7,499 applications being examined by offices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs which deal with this matter. They are people of various nationalities. Leonid has already spoken about people of Jewish nationality. So, as of 1 October there are a total of 7,499 applications. They are all being examined, and naturally all those who have the opportunity will have the opportunity to leave [sentence as heard]. But not all of them will make use of it, because this year 274 people, in 9 months, did not wish to leave, although they had that right. Well, let's finish with emigration.

So, the clip that was shown [an anti-smoking commercial—FBIS] reminded me again that we have problems in common, before it was alcoholism, now it is smoking. But there are others, too. This is what I'd like to say, that our parliaments are interested in many problems concerning human rights, interested in different ways. Take

for example the problem of health care. At the moment, we are taking a big poll, a study of public opinion, discussion of the draft law on health care improvement.

In the United States, as is well known from Congressional documents, they also have this problem, because many people cannot get adequate medical aid due to the expensive nature of health care. We'd like to know what does Congress intend to do in this context? There is one chronic problem in this context, drug addiction, which you have and which we have—true, to begin with we caught this disease from you, and it has grown here. What do you intend to do now? An exchange of experience would be interesting here.

[Moynihan] I would like to talk about this matter. Mr Zagladin, I am very glad that you have raised the issue of our Congress and your Supreme Soviet and how we work. Your parliament meets just four times a year, but we are meeting all the time. Here, we have our own problem: We have to somehow raise money in order to spend it on national programs.

[Moynihan continues] You don't have this problem, because you don't have political opponents in the Soviet Union. And speaking of what Mr. Laptev said about the problems of human rights, if we take the constitution, in the Soviet Union, in accordance with the constitution, one party dictates its policy; and this I think is what you call the dictatorship of the proletariat. You appear to have changed this, but the situation remains the same. We know that we want to talk to you, and no doubt you want to talk to us, but you are here as the official representative of your state, telling us what the state permits specifically for individual people. But we give these individual people the opportunity to decide for themselves what they want to do. It seems to me that no one can break out of the organisational system of your one and only party, no one can do that.

[Jennings] I would also like to add here, to ask you, what is Congress doing about health care?

[Moynihan] We are spending a lot of money now on medical programs in the United States; and in this respect the situation is improving. But I would like to draw your attention to the fact that in the 1970s, for example, life expectancy of the male population in the Soviet Union fell strikingly, and therefore the Soviet Union ceased publishing information on this. In a state in which everything is dictated by one party, even a telephone directory is a state secret, and can one possibly break out of this system, out of the framework of this system? I know what you are doing now, and what you have done already for your economy, but what can you do, what do you want for your people in this respect?

[Zolotarevskiy] Messrs. Laptev and Zagladin, apparently each of you wants to answer that in turn.

[Zagladin, gesturing] Mr. Laptev.

[Laptev] What we are doing for the economy we are doing for the people. We have no purely economic interests, all interests are the people's interests; and this seems completely normal to us and not even requiring proof. The whole reason we began our restructuring and are now working so intensively on it, why we are striving to raise our economy, is so that our people can live better, to improve their situation, to promote prosperity, and to solve those problems which we do indeed have, including health problems, of which we were speaking. I have to tell you that the life expectancy of our population is no longer a secret—you have information which is somewhat out of date too—and data are being published on how the life expectancy of our population is now rising. You know that the struggle which we waged...

[Moynihan interrupts] I grant that, that is true. In the 1980s you again began publishing statistics about life expectancy.

[Laptev] A lot of things have changed here. The point is that, of course, everything cannot change at once; I agree with you on that, that we do have a lot of problems here and even questions which depend on our own sluggishness, or our indecision, maybe inability to comprehend the new reality. We do have all that. But, a tremendous amount of work is now going on. As a result of the struggle which we have begun against drunkenness and alcoholism, there has now been a notable improvement in the health of the population; and as a result of those measures which are already being implemented—I particularly want to stress that, Mr. Senator—are already being implemented to improve the health service. I think that here our results will be, by our next meeting, even more striking.

[Zagladin] I hope we shall not be separated from the senators for long.

[Moynihan] Very good, we'll look forward to that opportunity, and we would like to work together with you. But you must explain to us how it is possible to escape from the iron dictatorship in the Kremlin; perhaps you could just give us a hint, and we'd like to help you. We don't want life expectancy in your country to fall, we want statistics on this to be published, apparently you didn't publish because you didn't want us to react to this in some way. But under the pressure of the state, a one-party state, and the dictatorship of the proletariat, how does the fate of the intellectuals turn out?

[Hoyer] Peter, let me ask Mr. Laptev another question, not connected with politics.

[Zagladin] Mr. Senator, first of all I would like to respond to your words about the dictatorship of the Kremlin, and your wish that we should break away from it. Do you not think that this is an appeal to overthrow state power in the Soviet Union? If you don't agree, please tell us so, but it looks very much like it. And if it is so, what does U.S. legislation say about that?

[Moynihan] No, sir, you should not think so; and if you continue to think so, we are going to have serious problems. We do not want to interfere with your ways of governing your country, and we would like for you not to interfere in our affairs. Mr. Gorbachev has already said that. But do you not see that you cannot have a free economy if you do not have a free government or, at least, if you do not have free church? [laughter on the Soviet side] And this regards Christianity and the Catholic Church in the Ukraine. Why cannot you open, for example, Sunday schools and to give the Baptists an opportunity to organize a seminary? You will feel better after that, you will feel stronger.

[Zolotarevskiy] Senator, Soviet participants in the discussion will, no doubt, answer all these questions and will take up the conversation on the dictatorship of a single party, and about the Ukrainian church and freedom of other churches, but do not you think that there are too many questions at once? You hardly have enough time to listen to the answers! And another small remark: You see, Mr. Zagladin has asked a question regarding the state of medical care in the United States...

[Zagladin interrupts] No, I am satisfied, I am satisfied.

[Zolotarevskiy] So you are satisfied, are you? Great.

[Zagladin] I want to carry on. A discussion has to be dynamic.

[Jennings] Then let us interrupt our program for a few minutes. After that we will answer your questions and our congressmen have a lot of questions for you too. [passage omitted, commercial break]

[Jennings] As we already explained to our viewers at the start of the program, there are USSR Supreme Soviet members in Moscow and congressmen in Washington who also would like to take part in the discussion. There are questions from the audience. We even have had calls from Moscow wanting to put a few questions during the discussion. Congressman Ben Gilman from New York:

[Gilman from the audience in Washington] Thank you. I would like to ask the Soviet journalists a few questions. Some years ago a number of representatives from Congress had an opportunity to touch upon several of these issues in the Kremlin and to talk about them with Mr. Smirnov, USSR minister of justice, and as far as I remember, he said that human rights is a Western propaganda trick. That was something very hard to hear. Now we see openness and glasnost which provide us with an opportunity to speak today about human rights and about our differences, because for too many years all we have heard from you in reply was: Look at your own blacks, Indians and homeless. Yes, we have these problems but we are striving to resolve them, we are prepared to discuss them openly and to carry out some reforms. And now we would like to be sure that the atmosphere

will be healthy and good for talking about arms reductions. Yet there is a certain degree of caution in optimism. Can we have a real hope that glasnost will mean a greater openness? We would like to ask whether it is true that Soviet bureaucracy is undergoing certain changes and that it is under a kind of pressure?

One would like to ask if one could hope for further developing contacts between Americans and Soviet citizens? For a number of years we have seen that it was impossible to maintain constant links between citizens of the United States and those of the USSR. You said today that about 500 individuals are expecting visas, yet I have been provided with statistics showing that since 1968 more than 650,000 invitations have been sent from Israel and 270 [as heard] permissions have been granted to Soviet citizens, which amounts to 383,000 refusals by 1986. We would like to learn about the fate of this considerable number of people, as there are very significant discrepancies between the figures the Soviet participants have cited and these figures. I would like to ask what we can do to overcome the barriers that are still in evidence in relations and contacts between us so as to reduce the number of restrictions that you still have regarding close relatives leaving. It is necessary somehow to overcome the problem of state secrets. I hope that the Soviet participants could give us assurances that glasnost means exactly what Mr. Gorbachev said.

[Jennings] The congressman has been in Congress a long time and he knows what filibustering is; but, hopefully, that is not the point in this case, and the questions seem generally to be clear to the Soviet side.

[Zagladin] The question is clear. First, I would like to continue our emotional dialogue with the senator. I like very much the fervor with which he voices his beliefs, though I cannot agree with him on their essence, of course. He said that we have a one-party system, the dictatorship of the proletariat—though this is in our history, not the present day—and, therefore, nothing would work here and nothing ever will. But Mr. Senator, there are countries with 25 parties, and one cannot say as follows: If America has 2 parties and they have 25 parties, then they have 12.5-fold more of democracy and freedom. This is hardly serious. It is not the number of parties, but the policy conducted that is the point. Over 70 years our policy has led to the fact that a country which was backward and agrarian has turned into a modern power. Our people who had not rights, were 80 percent illiterate, did not know at all what doctors were for, in many parts of the country, have turned into a most cultured people provided with social security in all respects. This is the result of our administration, and this is the result of the work of our party and our unfree, as you call it, government. And our people appreciate this correspondingly.

Does it mean that we are happy with everything? Of course not! We are very far from complacency. Mr. Gilman from New York, I think, just talked about a

meeting held a few years ago with our officials who had said that human rights is a propaganda slogan. Yes, such things have happened, such utterances have been made. But you, esteemed gentlemen, should understand that restructuring is for us not just a slogan or an abstract concept. It is an chasm, if you like, which has opened between the past and the future. It is a period of transition to a qualitatively new state of society within the framework of socialism. We will not renounce our system, nor are we renouncing it; and very soon you will see what it will be able to give compared to what we have already achieved.

Thus, development is going on, and if we look at the questions put by the representative from the state of New York there are changes in those issues too. But, one should say then and there that neither you nor us will give up state secrets. Say, you are not allowing specialists from Silicon Valley to leave the United States and you are right, in my view. The same with us: there are certain persons which...

[Jennings interrupts] Mr. Zagladin, Senator Moynihan seems to wish to comment on your words...

[Zolotarevskiy interrupts] I beg your pardon, but I would like to ask you to give our respected members of the panel a chance to conclude their remarks.

[Moynihan] Mr. Zagladin, we understand your country's pride and we know what a path you have made...

[Zagladin] Let him go ahead, let him! Let the senator...

[Moynihan] O surely, yes! I agree.

[Jennings] Leonid, I have to interfere. I have said that Congressman Gilman has long experience of Congressional work but we are trying to avoid long and extended speeches. Let us give other Supreme Soviet members an opportunity to speak.

[Zolotarevskiy] By the way, there is a question from our side. Deputy Zhukov: [Video shows Yuriy Zhukov in the audience]

[Zhukov] Good evening, Mr. Moynihan. Have you received my letter which I sent 10 days ago?

[Moynihan] The U.S. mail system is not up to the standards of the Soviet Union. I have to admit that.

[Zhukov] I was writing about the fate of Brian Wilson. [passage explaining details of how Wilson lost his legs. Steny Hoyer explains that it was a tragic incident, and investigations are being made]

[Man in audience at U.S. end, identified only as a Congressman from Pennsylvania] I would like to ask a question of the Soviet panel: It seems to me that putting it simply, the biggest difference between human rights in

our countries is the status of our mass media. Here in the United States, if the president sneezes, the whole world knows about it 5 minutes. With the Soviet mass media, whatever is going on, Mr Gorbachev can disappear for 90 days and nobody even in the Soviet Union will find out where he is. In the question of human rights, the whole world knew right away about what happened to Wilson, but we often have to wait many years in order to determine where this or that person may be, and to find out about events that have happened in the Soviet Union which affect the whole world, not just internal issues in the Soviet Union. Why is there not such freedom? Perhaps the editor-in-chief of *Izvestiya* will be able to reply to this question. Where was Mr. Gorbachev for so long?

[Laptev] Mr. Gorbachev has already answered this question; when he was meeting representatives of French political and public circles, he replied to the question himself; and this was published widely in all our papers, and it was broadcast on television and to the whole world. As far as the different positions of our mass media are concerned, I must say that such differences do indeed exist. They exist because of the very position of these mass media. But the differences do not in themselves determine the nature of the work of these mass media.

A previous question was asked about glasnost, about how seriously we can regard glasnost, whether it gives us any guarantees. You know, I will say this: We had one writer who wrote a wise phrase, that only an insurance company gives a 100 percent guarantee. So it probably is not quite correct to demand total guarantees from glasnost. Glasnost does not exist in isolation from everything else. But I would like our esteemed partners in conversation to understand what glasnost means for us. For glasnost is not simply reporting some news or other about whether the president sneezed or not. For the world will, in general, change little because the president sneezed or did not sneeze. For us, glasnost—I beg you to understand what I am saying correctly—is a form of public self-management and self-control; and in this manner, we are behind it and are trying to expand it comprehensively, and to include in it as many spheres of our life as possible. And we probably are still not managing to take in everything, but you can't do everything at once. In any case, in the struggle with bureaucracy as well as the struggle with our shortcomings, so to speak, and the struggle for human rights, glasnost has become a very good and effective weapon that is constantly becoming more sophisticated.

There is a question here that has been broached and I want to touch upon it. It was the question about the reliability of information.

[Jennings] Mr. Laptev, you used an expression that has interested us. You are saying that the circulation of your paper has grown significantly because wider information

is available. But you operate under the direction of the Communist Party, so you cover more events when the Communist Party wants this. Is this correct or not?

[Laptev] No, that is not correct. Of course the Communist Party directs society generally. According to our constitution it is the guiding force in society. But, representing things as if the Communist Party directly takes the editor by the hand and shows him what to do and how and what should be covered in his paper is, you know, a naive concept if you will forgive me, and quite inaccurate. I should say to you over the past 2 and 1/2 years...

[Moynihan, interrupting] Mr. Laptev, may I ask you a question?

[Laptev] Go ahead.

[Jennings] I shall have to apologise to both of you. Senator Moynihan has a question, but we have to take a short break. [passage omitted, commercial break]

[Jennings] Returning to our program, you have probably noticed there is a little, quite insignificant interval, delay, in the transmitting of the television signal from Moscow to Washington and back. And apart from this there is a very small delay in the interpreting, because the interpreters do not always manage to pick up the flow of the discussion right away. When we show the commercials the Soviet audience can also see part of this advertising. I do not know what the reaction of the Soviet audience to a wood polish is, but they are gradually starting to use commercials on Soviet television now. And to stress the importance of our program, I want to say once again that this is a live program and approximately 24 million people in the Soviet Union are watching this program for the first time in the history of Soviet television. Over to you, Leonid:

[Zolotarevskiy] Ivan Dmitrievich you did not finish.

[Laptev] Yes, I did not finish my answer to the question posed, that is the problem of the reliability of information. Figures and data on a number of matters that are being touched on in our program are appearing on both sides. These figures are very conflicting. Of course it may be that the United States and U.S. senators have a better view of what is going on in one or another of our towns.

[Laptev continues] But I should simply like to raise the question, that if we are making various complaints about each other here, the problem of the reliability of information should take pride of place. For instance, it is known that certain invitations which were sent to the Soviet Union, for exits, even exceeded the number of number of those who wanted to go, exceeded even the total listed number of people living in some specific region or other with respect to the specified nationality or social group. Therefore I wish to state with full authority that the lists on which we rely are totally

verified data, data which have been gone through many times. So, it seems to me that we can put more reliance in them. And lastly, concerning the management of the media, direct management: Mr. Senator, I have stated, and I repeat quite categorically, that in 2 and 1/2 years there has been virtually not a single instance of direct intervention by party bodies in the affairs of *Izvestiya*. I know this from my own experience. And this is a proof that some of the information on which judgements are formed by U.S. citizens may not be correctly understood.

[Zolotarevskiy] Thank you, Ivan Dmitriyevich. I think it would also be possible to add that not all the mass media by any means belong to party bodies. On the contrary, the majority of newspapers and journals in our country do not belong to party bodies; they belong to various public organisations, creative unions, societies, for example anglers societies, and so on; so we have very varied, very diversified mass media. And you, Peter, we are not behaving very democratically toward our deputies, who have many questions, and I wish now to permit one of them to use this right.

[Turysov] Karatay Turysov, deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet. As I understood it, the congressmen are closely following the desire to emigrate in our country, but I wonder if the congressmen know that for decades, there has been a discriminatory practice regarding visas. In the United States, there exists a discriminatory visa practice against tourist groups of Soviet working people and against Soviet trade union activists. [Turysov is chairman of the Kazakhstan Republic Trade Union Council—FBIS]

What do they think about this, and how is this matter going to develop, in view of the Helsinki agreement on human rights, and so on? And in this connection, I would like to know what the congressmen think, is this not a breach of the rights of American working people to invite their own guests, at their own choice, to visit them?

[Jennings] Congressman Hoyer.

[Hoyer] Permit me to say that this is an interesting point. We in the United States talk about the right of people to leave the Soviet Union. You in the Soviet Union talk about the right of people to enter the United States. I personally think that says something about our systems. However, in response to your question, I shall say that we do have certain restrictions, and to the extent that we can overcome them, the Helsinki Committee of the United States is trying to solve this problem. We shall speak of a specific example, the McCarran-Walter Act. It was passed at a time when we had antagonistic relations towards communism, and we would like—our ideas were not what they should have been. We wanted to amend this legislation and held...

[Moynihan interrupts] I also spoke in the Senate. I said it was a disgusting bill. Simply crazy.

[Jennings] Is this legislation being applied more energetically under Reagan?

[Moynihan] That's just why we are amending this law.

[Hoyer] By the way, it seems to me that we are reviewing many (?cases). However, the important thing is that we let in 85 percent of those who want to come. The criticism is not just in that respect. Those rare instances when we do not permit entry are exceptions. Nevertheless, we are discussing this, and it is getting a lot of publicity. In any case, we criticize such instances. You criticize from the Soviet side, and that is all in accordance with the Helsinki Agreement.

[Jennings] Sorry to interrupt you; we have a question from the audience.

[Solomon] Congressman Solomon, state of New York.

[Jennings] I would like to tell the participants in our discussion and those who are watching us that we shall be extending our program for a certain time, to everyone's satisfaction. Please continue.

[Solomon] I think the time has come to face the question. Let's alter the procedure. Let me ask a question first and then make a short statement. Mr. Gorbachev, why do you not raise the Iron Curtain, knock down the wall that divides us, and we will be able to share a number of the questions which we have been discussing today with the Soviet representatives? I am a member of the Human Rights sub-committee in the House of Representatives. We are obliged to study the reports of various international organizations. The most frequent complaints are suppression of the right to political dissidence and suppression of the right to free movement and the right of people to live where they want to live. One of our problems in the U.S. Congress—I am aware that Mr. Hoyer knows about this, Mr. Moynihan too—we write letters to Mr. Gorbachev, Andrey Gromyko, and other leaders of the Soviet Union, which are signed by many congressmen who are very concerned about specific cases of specific families. In this actual letter last August, 50 congressmen drew attention to 3 outstanding Soviet citizens of Ukrainian origin. They were sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and 5 years exile for a crime which consisted only of the fact that they made critical statements about your system of control. As an example, we have here in the United States Jesse Jackson, who is a severe critic of the ruling party, the Republican Party. But Jesse Jackson is not in prison. Jesse Jackson is running for president of the United States. I would like you to answer our questions. Why do you not raise the Iron Curtain, and then you would be a hero to all mankind, for then we would have a free flow (?of ideas) in both directions. Let me remind you that Mr. (?Iovocetti) is present, he is taking part.

[Jennings] I would like to note that the words you just said come from President Reagan; he said them in Berlin. What do those on your side have to say in reply to the congressman, Leonid?

[Zolotarevskiy] Mr. Zagladin:

[Zagladin] This is a whole range of questions all of which in effect boil down to one. I shall begin with what Mr. Hoyer was saying, then Senator Moynihan added to it, about the party and the state, the relationship between them. I mention this question not because I am dissatisfied with anything, I just want to clear something up. You know, one of the directions of our search at present, search for solutions, is precisely to establish the relations between the party and the state.

[Zagladin continues] The party is the political and ideological leader of society, but it is not the administrative leader of it. It is not the party that manages the state. True, there were periods in our country in the past when this was lumped together—periods of emergency, such as during the war. These periods became protracted, and we are very dissatisfied with that. At the Party Congress in 1986, we introduced a special provision in the charter that the party does its thing, deals with its political, ideological, educational issues, and the state deals with its own affairs, just as all other public organizations do. I think it is important to explain this so that you can see the direction we are working in. Hence, the relationship between the party and the mass media, which Ivan Dmitrievich Laptev was talking about.

Now, concerning the Iron wall [as heard]. We have no wall. Come and visit us again, if you have not yet been here or it is a long time since you were here; come and see us; there is no wall. I have already talked about the fact that we have changed the entry and exit procedures. Anyone who wants to can come and visit us; they do what they want, they go where they want, they say what they want to whomever they want; there are no problems here in our country. I don't know, I think neither the senator nor Mr. Hoyer—by the way, Mr. Hoyer, I read your article in *The Washington Post* concerning the McCarran-Walter Act; congratulations, it's a very interesting article. So, there is no wall. Come and see for yourself. Our citizens now leave the country in hundreds of thousands, in millions, for various reasons every year.

Well, what do we have? We have laws. There are laws which one must not violate, either in your country or in ours. It is true that in a number of cases we have laws in existence which reflect certain hold-overs and the inheritance from the past, that is true. The past was difficult, in practice, we lived very long years under siege; and many of our laws, including the criminal code, to this day bear the stamp of that state of siege. We are changing this now. We are changing it in two directions: On the one hand, practice is changing. For example, you were talking about political prisoners. Usually, two articles are referred to: Article 70 of the Criminal Code, and Article

191. So, in practice these issues no longer exist here, because we have less than 20 people left who were convicted under Article 70, and indeed for serious crimes against the state, and there are hardly any under Article 191. So these—and by the way the amnesty declared in connection with the 70th October Revolution anniversary is still in force, and many cases will be reviewed in connection with this. On the other hand, a reform of the legislation is under way, and changes to the criminal code are among the things being examined, including these articles. I can't say at the moment how it will be changed; discussions are in progress. But the direction is that of democratization of these articles, decriminalization of certain acts, that is, certain things which we considered dangerous crimes in the past will now be viewed as infringements under administrative law and no more. Certain things are being brought completely into the sphere of political discussion.

[Jennings] You just mentioned a number of ideas which Americans view as exceptionally important ideas, especially those who follow the observation of human rights. So, you have in mind that the article which forbids anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. Article 70 of the criminal code forbidding anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, is to be changed. For it is under this article that many Soviet citizens became political prisoners.

[Zagladin] Evidently, this article is to be changed. I repeat: I do not know specifically in what way, but I can predict the direction, because I am conversant with the discussions in progress. What is that direction? There remains the crime against the state—calls to overthrow the state system, or whatever—which exists in U.S. and every other legislation. Evidently, it will be in such a spirit. But evidently this article will not survive with the wording which it has at present; it will be changed. So I repeat to you once again, restructuring is not just a word.

[Unidentified person in audience at U.S. end] And what about Article 190?

[Zagladin] The issue is being examined of whether it is needed at all. There are different points of view, so let's wait and see; the discussions are in progress.

[Jennings] Senator Moynihan, Congressman Hoyer, does that impress you?

[Moynihan] Yes, it is very impressive, and very important. The sincerity with which Mr. Zagladin speaks is striking. We can talk about the number of people who were subject to repression during Stalin's rule, but now we have a completely different situation. But concerning religion, I would like to say this is such an important thing. I understand that two parties just cannot exist in your country, but you could at least have the churches. Why don't you permit the Catholic Church of the Ukraine (to) become a normal church and let the Baptists hold their ceremonies and open Sunday schools so people can go to them.

[Zagladin] I would like to make one very brief observation about what the senator was saying. I agree with him, that the repressions of the Stalin period were an intolerable thing. We will never forget this affair, we will not forgive it. That was the fault of the people who were in charge of the state at the time. A stop was put to it once and for all. The senator and we agree. Now, I would like to ask Peter for an opportunity to make an advertisement on my own behalf, and not to count it as part of my speaking time.

[Zagladin continues] We would like to put a few proposals to our colleagues, proposals for the future, very briefly. Firstly, since both you and we have an interest in the state of human rights, we would suggest that each of our parliaments, the Congress and the Supreme Soviet, should once a year or once every 2 years—whatever we agree on—produce reports on the state of affairs in their own countries, and send them to each other. We could publish these reports, and that would probably be an interesting precedent. Secondly, we already spoke earlier about the fact that it would be possible to create a standing bilateral group of the two parliaments to discuss specific cases. I think this is worth implementing—what do you think about it? Thirdly, there is a problem of international law. There are a number of international documents concerning human rights. Our countries—or the United States in any case, and there are probably some of them that we have not—have not subscribed to them all. Let's think this problem through. Then, fourthly, let's think about how the international legal obligations which our countries have taken on are reflected in our domestic legislation, and exchange opinions about this, what can be done to make improvements. And finally, I would like to express the hope that the United States, including the esteemed members of Congress, will take part in the conference on humanitarian issues in Moscow which we have proposed; there we could continue any conversation on any of the themes we have touched on. Thank you, that was my advertisement, and my question.

[Jennings] Congressman Hoyer.

[Zolotarevskiy] Peter, Deputy Sepetis has some information for us at our end. Excuse me, carry on.

[Sepetis] I am simply amazed at the congressmen's words when they talk like that, saying that our churches should be free. They are virtually completely free. In my republic, Lithuania, 650 Catholic churches are operating, with more than 700 priests; a seminary operates in Kaunas which trains clergy. Literature is published. Our, so to speak, representatives of the clergy travel to the Vatican, straight to their leadership, so it sounds a bit strange to hear such words about lack of freedom for the church in our country. Other denominations are active in our republic as well—Orthodox, although not many, Jewish, and so on.

[Zolotarevskiy] Thank you.

[Jennings] Congressman Hoyer, you have heard a whole series of very important proposals. What do you have to say?

[Hoyer] I would like to answer the first question. The United States has responded to concern about what goes on in the United States. I have here in my hand a book [holds up a white book] "The United States and the Helsinki Final Act." I will be happy to send a copy of this document to our Soviet friends. We think it is very important to examine it ourselves, it is also important from the point of view of discussion of [words indistinct] problems. Just last Friday I was talking with the deputy head of the delegation in Vienna about human rights, security, and economic cooperation. These issues are very important for our two countries. We could argue about what the Soviet Union has ratified, what the United States has ratified, but what concerns Soviet citizens and concerns American citizens are our deeds, not the documents which we sign, (including) the Helsinki Final Act. There we made certain promises, but what concerns citizens is what we do; and in this respect, Mr Zagladin, we are discussing this problem. Our deeds provide confidence for our relations, a confidence which we ourselves feel. The matter concerns domestic legislation. Last week, I was discussing this issue with Mr (Aksenov), last Monday—you may know him, he occupies a similar position. It would be ironic if we allowed acts of legislation to negate the promises which made to each other in Helsinki Final Act, in the UN Charter and in other international documents about human rights. Finally, you mentioned the Moscow conference which Mr Shevardnadze proposed in Vienna.

[Jennings] The proposal the Soviet Union has made, to stage a conference on humanitarian issues in Moscow; Shevardnadze made the proposal at the opening of the Vienna meeting.

[Hoyer] The reaction of the West was that it would be ironic to stage such a conference in the country which is the chief violator of human rights among the 35 countries which signed the Final Act. However, we did not reject this proposal out of hand. Mr Zimmerman, the ambassador, the head of our delegation in Vienna, made a whole series of suggestions for the examination of Mr Kashlev, the head of the Soviet delegation.

[Jennings] Are you both in favor of this conference if the Soviet representatives invite representatives of nongovernmental organizations?

[Hoyer] Peter, I will reserve my reaction. What we expect from each other is fulfillment of the promises made in the field of human rights. That is the main thing. I know that many thousands of cases of human rights violations exist, at least [words indistinct] 900 cases. If this is resolved, if all...

[Jennings interrupts] I don't know, why do you object so to a conference if everyone is there to take part in it?

[Hoyer] Never mind that. (Something is wrong here). It would not be correct to stage such a conference in the country which violates human rights. [Jennings] But it would be a fine opportunity for all people of the world to gather in a country where a human rights problem exists.

[Moynihan] I have to say that we must be frank...

[Zolotarevskiy] The fact is that I want make quite a strong protest at the way the question is being put. What is making it possible for Congressmen Hoyer to state that the Soviet Union is the biggest violator of human rights? It seems to me that this is not just an incautious statement, it is probably a thoughtless statement, since it comes not from a private individual but from a representative of the U.S. Congress. So may I protest vigorously once again at such a way of putting a question.

[Zagladin] I agree with Leonid: in form he and I argue, but in essence our position is the same.

[Hoyer] May I respond briefly to that? I think it is a correct statement from the Western point of view; but I would also like to say that we think certain progress is being made; we feel certain hopes and expectations, as Senator Moynihan said. We will now be having more positive discussions than before. We see certain progress, the more progress we see, the better our ties will be, our cooperation, and the more opportunity there will be strengthen cooperation and security.

[Zolotarevskiy] I am very glad that Congressman Hoyer has moderated his stand somewhat during our discussion. Excuse me for interrupting.

[Zagladin] It is very important that he said "from the western point of view."

[Moynihan] May I just say this: I would like to say, Mr Zagladin, that your friend and colleague Mr Nikonorov was here with the delegation from Soviet Union. They visited the senate and I was at a luncheon with them. We are always glad to be visited by members of other countries' delegations, government delegations. And I said that we would like to arrange some sort of exchange between our parliaments, so I think you're right.

[Zolotarevskiy] I thank you, and I would like to tell our audience that we will break off once again for a short while. [passage omitted, commercial break]

[Jennings] We are now coming to the final part of our unprecedented discussion program on human rights in the United States and the Soviet Union, and I would like to ask the American politicians and the Soviet Supreme Soviet deputies to be brief so that the last part of our program can be as fruitful as possible and we can hear as many people as possible from the audience.

[Zolotarevskiy] Peter, your suggestion is, of course, accepted. The discussion developing between us really is very interesting. It has been a sharp discussion, and I think both sides—or at least our side—have shown quite a bit of patience. But, to follow your advice, we will now ask a deputy in our audience to speak.

[Unidentified American] What's happened? It's our turn, isn't it?

[Zolotarevskiy] Please go ahead.

[Savage] Thank you. Congressman Savage from Illinois: Yes, I would like to say here that the black population is denied full human rights. For example, we are not able to get adequate coverage of our interests on television, compared with the number of our black athletes. [as heard] But I would simply like to ask: When General Secretary Gorbachev said, I think in May, that the answer to our problems could be found in creating a separate, independent country within the territory of the United States, why do you think that that is where the solution lies; and if so, how do you think it could actually be brought about?

[Laptev] First of all, I would like to say that General Secretary Gorbachev didn't say that. What he said in that conversation was that in our country we have autonomy for national minorities, and they have their own republics, but in your country there is no autonomy for the national minorities, and they do not have their own states. That is what he was talking about—not about the setting up of some sort of independent countries on the territory of the United States, and I think there's just been some confusion in conveying what our general secretary said.

[Zolotarevskiy] Thank you, Ivan Dmitriyevich. Now we have a question from our side. Please go ahead. Introduce yourself, please.

[Isayev] My name is Aleksandr Isayev. I'm a scientist, a specialist in forest ecology. I represent Krasnoyarsk Kray, which is the center of Siberia, where I was elected deputy to the Supreme Soviet. I am secretary of a commission for environmental protection, so what I have to say will be devoted to those aspects of the defense of human rights. I think that this is a very important stance. We may speak of social protection, political protection, being allowed or not allowed to leave the country, but for us and for the generations to come we should be speaking of the protection of the environment, because this is a very important aspect of the social rights of man and the possibility of existing. We must be able to drink good water, breathe good air and walk in green forests which have not been drenched in acid rain. And in our country quite a lot is being done in this respect, particularly now when restructuring is in progress and we have glasnost, and what writers and public figures have to say has a very active influence on the position of the government and parliament to ensure

that things which used to be done are not continued. In particular, as you know, the diversion of the Siberian rivers to the south was scrapped. It was wrong for the issue to have been raised. A very important decision has been taken about Lake Baykal, which contains 20 percent of the world's fresh water; and the creation of a zone around Lake Baykal is very important. And these too, I think, are questions of protecting human rights.

[Zolotarevskiy] Aleksandr Sergeyevich, excuse me...

[Isayev] And I have a question, a question.

[Zolotarevskiy] I'm sorry. Thank you very much for raising that issue; you can ask your question in a moment, but the thing is that the problems you mentioned—extremely important ones—will, I think, be discussed in another telebridge with the United States and will probably be fully, deeply and totally covered there. Now, what is your question, please?

[Isayev] I think that this question is part of the protection of human rights and that it is legitimate to raise it here. My question to the senators is: How do things stand with social protection in the United States against arbitrary action by manufacturers who pollute the atmosphere? I put that question specifically to Senator...

[Jennings] Senator Moynihan?

[Isayev] Yes, yes, Senator Moynihan, who represents New York State. I know there are serious problems there. Now has the situation there changed now, and what laws does it have in that respect?

[Moynihan] Thank you very much for asking that question. It's a question that we can exchange information on, and even monitor each other—though not in the sense that the word is used in arms control. We have to watch how the environment is being protected in our countries, and I would like to monitor the scientists to insure that they carry out their research with the aim of improving the situation in this area so that we can drink pure water and breathe pure air. But I've been in Moscow, and I think that you ought to think about automobile exhaust fumes. It's quite a problem in Moscow, so you have problems in that area, too.

[Jennings] The last question.

[Unidentified man in U.S. audience] Mr Hoyer has mentioned a certain person; here is a lady who has not been able to reunite with her husband for 9 years [video shows a young woman sitting in the audience beside the speaker] They have two children and the youngest daughter has had no opportunity to meet her father at all. My question is as follows: she has even been denied an opportunity to contact her husband by telephone. the Helsinki Final Act mentions directly the right of families to reunite and for members of families to maintain

contacts. Why has she been denied an opportunity to speak to her husband by telephone, at least, during all the time while he has been trying to get permission to emigrate?

[Jennings] Mr Zagladin, will you please answer this question?

[Zolotarevskiy] I beg your pardon, Peter. The point is that Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin has answered similar questions more than once. Now, once again, a certain specific case—moreover, an unidentified one, has been taken as an example. The proposals made by Zagladin says precisely this: that special commissions of the Congress and the Supreme Soviet will be requested to exchange information on specific cases and to carry out joint examination of these specific cases. Therefore, if you accept this proposal, then the case you have just mentioned will be examined in an appropriate way. What I would like to say now is the following: the last exchanges between Deputy Isayev and Senator Moynihan that we heard contained practically one and the same wish: that we should breathe clean air and live in a clean world. I would like to expand the interpretation of these words. I think that it should be expanded in the following way, more or less: I would like that we live in a world clear of suspicions and misinformation...

[Jennings] Leonid, Leonid...

[Zolotarevskiy]...and that we breath an air clear of suspicions and misinformation.

[Jennings] Leonid, I'm going to just try to make a point here if I may—sorry if I'm breaking into the discussion. It may seem strange to you—indeed, it seems strange to me, as the American chairman—that Mrs Balovlenko is here, here she is among us, and I think both Mr Laptev and Mr Zagladin will be able to see for themselves the depth of feeling that is being experienced by the members of this family who cannot be reunited. These questions—similar questions—have often been put to Mr Zagladin. I hope he understands, that Soviet people understand, that it's not just a question of a few individual cases. It's a matter of what you might call the common nature, the human nature, of all people. Perhaps some additional explanation will be needed here.

[Hoyer, in English] It is important to understand, for all of us to understand. There are three baskets in Helsinki...

[Zolotarevskiy] Vadim Valentinovich, the U.S. side insists that you should give an additional explanation.

[Zagladin] I could once again...

[Hoyer] I would like to (?clarify) one question. The question of environment has been asked and I said to one of my Soviet colleagues that one reason why we are not examining specific technological and economic questions is that we're concerned about human rights and

security. As Mr Tolkunov said, human rights are important from the point of view of security. If we solve the problem of these two "baskets," then we'll concentrate our efforts on the environment, because we are, above all, engaged in examining other matters—all the states that have signed the Final Act. We have to solve these problems for the wellbeing of Soviet citizens and of Americans and of all the people of the world.

[Jennings] Leonid, now perhaps we could have a final comment from the Supreme Soviet?

[Zolatarevskiy] But a question has been asked...

[Zagladin interrupts] Brief comments and some last words. A brief comment from us. Mr Hoyer, we could also say that we'll make the whole future dependent on when your country will do away altogether with unemployment, homelessness, illiteracy; when there will no longer be arrests without warrant, as happens, judging by reports in your press. But I think mutual linkages of this sort are unproductive. We've got to move forward in all areas, move forward together. On the specific case: all questions...

[Hoyer interr.:pts] Mr Zagladin, with all due respect there's no analogy. There's no analogy between the issue of systems and the Helsinki Final act and human rights.

[Zagladin] There is an analogy.

[Zagladin] I'll tell you, I'll tell you.

[Hoyer] We don't agree with you.

[Zagladin] I understand. And this is the point I'd like to raise in our final observation. You've shown a very good picture of how sputniks transmit signals to each other, Moscow to Washington and back. It is indeed a brilliant technical feat and I congratulate all those involved in creating and running it. But our discussion shows that we and you, in the course of our discussion, in our dialogue, are falling behind the level of our technology. With us, the remains of the freezes of past years and decades are still having an effect; and we have to remove them together. Mr Hoyer is saying: I don't agree, there's no parallel. But earlier on he said rightly that from the point

of view of the West, you have—you country, our country, that is—has violations of human rights. From our point of view, your country is an example of violation of human rights, and ours of the opposite. So evidently, we're both right: you from your point of view, are right, according to your way of approaching things; and we are certainly right if we approach the question from the standpoint of our social requirements and criteria. Here we need to know each other better, to discuss, exchange information and try to solve together certain problems that exist, within the framework of the law. Helsinki, by the way, lays down strictly that the laws of all countries must be observed. And a last point: We are going through a period of restructuring. We are making a great many changes in accordance with our principles and in our interests, in the interests of our society and in the interests of all mankind. But I have the feeling that perhaps you, our dear American colleagues, ought also to be thinking about some kind of restructuring. [laughter] Mr Hoyer and Mr Moynihan have spoken very well about the McCarran-Walter act and about other problems that must be solved. I want to say that I call on you to do something. You will decide this yourselves; but it seems that both you and we must do some thinking. And I think we'll both gain something if we think about many questions together.

[Jennings] Mr Zagladin, on behalf the American participants, Senator Moynihan and Congressman Hoyer, I thank you. I thank you, Mr Laptev. I thank Leonid. We take leave of you and take our leave of the Soviet viewers. We also intend to say good bye to the American viewers, and we look forward to our next meeting on 18 November, during our next direct broadcast. Again, I thank those who have been taking part on the Soviet side.

[Zolotoveskiy] I thank Mr Hoyer, and you, Peter. The discussion has certainly been interesting, and let us hope that it will have been useful. As regards the next meeting, yes, it will be on 18 November for you; for us it will be the 19th. We'll have learned a few lessons from the previous discussions and we'll make it still more fruitful. Thank you for taking part, and good bye to you, Soviet and American viewers. [video shows caption: "USSR Gosteleradio in collaboration with the television companies ABC and 'Internews' (USA)"]

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**Review of Journal LATINSKAYA AMERIKA No 8, 1987**

18070002a Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English  
3 Sep 87 pp 1-4

[Text] The integration into the international socialist economy served as a powerful factor which stimulated both the revolutionary transformation of Cuban society and the rapid growth of the economy and the improvement of the people's living standards. M. Manasov writes in the article "International Ties of Cuban Revolution".

Within the framework of the continually developing relations of Cuba with the countries of the socialist community, its all-round - economic, political and cultural - cooperation with the Soviet Union played and continues to play the decisive role. The prime aim of this cooperation is to help complete the construction of the material-technical base of socialism in the Republic. As a result of the joint efforts of the Communist Parties, governments and peoples of the USSR and Cuba, an effective mechanism of bilateral cooperation, which embraces all spheres of life - socio-political, trade-economic, scientific-technical, cultural and others - has been created.

Trade turnover between the two countries has been making fast headway. In 1986 it exceeded 7.6 billion roubles (160 million roubles in 1960). The Soviet Union fully satisfies Cuba's requirements for oil and oil products, metals, fertilizers, timber, and other raw materials. In turn, the Republic supplies to the USSR increasing amounts of raw sugar, nickel-containing products, citrus fruits, and other goods.

As many as 300 various projects of the national economy have been built and modernised in the Freedom Island with Soviet technical assistance. These enterprises not only meet the needs of Cuba but also serve to boost its export potential and to extend its foreign economic relations.

Cuba's relations with other countries of the socialist community have been continually broadening and deepening. Their assistance to the Republic in the development of its national economy figures prominently in its cooperation with them. Over 200 various projects have been built and retooled with their assistance.

The article says that, due to its participation in the international socialist division of labour and to the strong and deep ties with the USSR and other socialist countries in all spheres, Cuba, within the historically shortest time, has turned from a backward semicolonial country into a rapidly developing socialist state which is reaching the high economic and scientific-technical standards of world development. The integration into the socialist community rids the Republic of the awful ails of the world capitalist economy which are the lot of most of developing countries - imperialist exploitation by the

TNCs, the effects of the crisis phenomena in the developed capitalist countries, the pumping out of immense sums of currency by the international financial centres, and the aggravation of social contradictions. The practice of the construction of new society in Cuba - with all the achievements and difficulties of this construction - is of immense international importance because it proves the fundamental possibility of breaking with the world capitalist economy and joining the system of equal cooperation of socialist states.

Cuba generously shares its rich historic experience with developing countries, above all, with the states of socialist orientation. As Fidel Castro noted, Cuba's gratuitous aid to developing states can be evaluated at 1 billion dollars a year. Cuba's relations with progressive African countries, specifically Angola and Ethiopia, are a graphic illustration of such all-round cooperation. Nicaragua figures prominently in the relations of Cuba with the Latin American countries. Thousands of Cuban specialists help the young Republic develop its agriculture, transport and communications, education and the health services.

The Communist Party of Cuba, together with other Marxist-Leninist Parties, actively works for unity of the international Communist and working-class movement, and makes consistent efforts for the termination of the arms race and elimination of the threat of a nuclear catastrophe, for peace and social progress. M. Manasov writes in conclusion.

"Latin America in U. S. 'Neoglobalist' Plans" is the subject of an article by V. Sudarev.

He writes that the 1980s were marked by yet unheard-of emphasis on military and political aspects of the U. S. Latin American policy. The latter's conceptual "basis" of the region's militarisation had been inherent in the Santa Fe Document whose authors arrived at the conclusion that since a "Third World War" had already begun in Central America and the Caribbean, the United States ought to seek some efficient means not only to "contain communism" in the area but to turn the latter into a bridgehead for a subsequent "ousting" of the Soviet Union from other parts of the developing world. New aspects were added to that theory over the years that followed to grow into the doctrine of "neoglobalism" by the mid-1980s.

One way to translate this policy into reality is through the so called policy of "low-intensity conflicts". The chief idea of this policy—to deliver first and foremost effective strikes at national liberation movements—is based on an array of military, political, economic, psychological and other means to influence the situation not only by applying force to rebel movements but also—

which is no less important—by winning over the population. The chief role in accomplishing this project is assigned either to the local military or to mercenary gangs. Direct involvement of U. S. troops is seen as an extreme measure.

That Latin America was chosen as the chief object of "neoglobalism" was by far not accidental. Its geographical proximity, its higher development level as compared to other regions of Washington's political and economic penetration, and, finally, in the eyes of Washington, a lower risk of global confrontation—these and other factors, in the eyes of Washington, have conditioned the turning of the continent into a sort of a laboratory for trying out the doctrine of "neoglobalism". Along with the general line to increase economic dependence of Latin American nations and use the continent as a testing range for so called "limited sovereignty" and "controlled democracy" models likely to be applied in the future, there is also a clear-cut and elaborate system of military and political means to influence the situation.

The author goes on to consider different aspects of the U. S. policy of "neoglobalism" in Central America and the Caribbean, as well as the role of the South Atlantic in the military and political strategy of the United States.

The journal also carries the following pieces: "The South Atlantic Must Become a Zone of Peace" by S. Zhirnov and N. Isakova; "The Spirit of Contadora Must be Safeguarded", an interview with President Vinicio Cerezo of Guatemala; "Difficulties Faced by Independent Surinam" by Ye. Pashentsev, etc.

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#### **Brazil's Initiative for South Atlantic Nuclear-Free Zone Praised**

*18070002b Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 8, Aug 87 pp 27-33*

[Article by O. A. Zhirnov and N. M. Isakova: "The South Atlantic Must Become a Zone of Peace"]

[Text] Brazil's initiative concerning the establishment of a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZMS) is unquestionably a most important foreign policy action by the countries of Latin America, with significance which goes beyond the region's boundaries. It should be stated that the concept of establishing such a zone is not new. It originated essentially at the same time as the plans to establish the SATO [presumably: South Atlantic Treaty Organization] military bloc in the region and to counterbalance it. However, the concept of demilitarizing the South Atlantic began to acquire definite outlines only with the assumption of power by civilian governments in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.

After a number of bilateral meetings and an exchange of views, President Sarney gave advance notification at the 40th UN General Assembly Session in September 1985

of his intention to initiate the establishment of a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic. This intention was confirmed in May 1986 in a letter from Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Roberto Costa de Abreu Sodre to UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. The message from the head of Itamaraty stated that Brazil will make every effort to ensure that the South Atlantic remains a region free from the arms race, nuclear weapons, and any kind of hostilities.

As a result of Brazilian diplomacy's persistent efforts, supported by the countries of Latin America and other states in the world community, including socialist states, the question of establishing a ZMS was included as a separate paragraph in the work agenda of the 41st UN General Assembly Session. A resolution proclaiming the establishment of a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic was adopted on 27 October 1986. Adoption of the resolution presented for a vote by 11 developing countries, most of which are located in the South Atlantic basin<sup>1</sup>, was supported by 124 states (including the socialist states); eight abstained<sup>2</sup>, and only the United States voted against the resolution.

The resolution states in particular that "the General Assembly, taking into account the determination of the peoples of South Atlantic states to preserve their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and to develop their relations under conditions of peace and freedom... and recognizing the particular interest of states in the region in extending regional cooperation for the purpose of economic development and safeguarding peace and their particular responsibility in this regard, solemnly declares the region of the Atlantic Ocean between Africa and South America a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic."<sup>3</sup>

The resolution expresses the conviction that creation of the ZMS "will make an important contribution to the effort to strengthen world peace and security and to promote the principles and objectives of the United Nations." In this connection, the United Nations called upon all countries of the world, and the great powers in particular, to strictly observe the status of the South Atlantic region as a zone of peace and cooperation, to put an end to their military presence, and not to station weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations considers putting an end to the apartheid system in the RSA and granting independence to Namibia to be mandatory conditions for safeguarding peace and security in the South Atlantic.

At the same time, the voting results also revealed differences among members of the international community in their approaches to the plan advanced by Brazil. The overwhelming majority of Latin American countries supported establishment of a ZMS in the South Atlantic. The positive position on this question is the consequence of noticeable changes in the foreign policy of many states

in the region and their increased interest in disarmament matters and in searches for ways and means of maintaining regional and international security.

The attention being devoted by South American countries to the South Atlantic basin—a region which the aggressive circles of imperialism are counting on involving in the sphere of their military and strategic interests—is natural in the context of these changes. On one hand, the Malvinas crisis graphically demonstrated to states in the subregion the reality of the threat to their sovereignty and security; on the other hand, it demonstrated the urgent necessity of creating an international legal mechanism capable of protecting them from any intervention from outside and from encroachments on their sovereignty in the event that imperialism's strong points spring up here.<sup>4</sup> Sodre declared this directly at the 41st UN General Assembly Session in presenting the Brazilian plan. Establishment of the ZMS, he said, pursues the objective of guaranteeing peace, security and development for a vast region of the globe which includes the countries of two continents, united by the common aspiration to surmount the obstacles to progress which arise on their path. Speaking of specific sources of a threat to the security of countries in the region, Sodre pointed to the crisis in South Africa and the situation which has taken shape with respect to the Malvinas (Falkland Islands). In his view, declaring the South Atlantic a zone of peace and cooperation would be "a specific step" within the framework of that broad program which the international community considers of great importance "to turn irrational impulses toward confrontation into constructive activity in the area of peaceful international cooperation."<sup>5</sup>

An important element in the Brazilian plan is making the South Atlantic nuclear-free, which means eliminating all types of nuclear weapons here; at the same time, the nuclear-free zone which would be established in this region could become an addition to the nuclear-free zone which exists in Latin America in conformity with the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Responsibility and realism characterize Brazil's approach to the military and political situation which has taken shape in the South African subregion. "The Brazilian initiative," Itamaraty's declaration stressed, "does not aspire to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries."<sup>6</sup> This was brought to light, for example, in evaluating the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, which cannot interfere with declaration of the South Atlantic as a zone of peace and cooperation and is correctly considered an internal matter of this sovereign state, in the view of the representative of Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

One of the features of the plan to establish the ZMS is the concept of cooperation among coastal states, viewed as an important addition to steps of a military and political nature. In explaining its substance, Sodre stated in an interview with the Soviet weekly ZA RUBEZHOM that

this concept involves different forms of cooperation: in the economic area (this includes expanding trade volume and technical cooperation), as well as the development of promising new fields in which the biogeographical similarity and mutually complementary aspects of the countries of West Africa and South America could be utilized to advantage.<sup>7</sup>

Argentina displayed great interest in adoption of the resolution. A number of remarks made by the Argentine representation touched on the problems stemming from Great Britain's military presence in the South Atlantic, not only from the stationing of a military base in the Malvinas (Falkland Islands), but because of its possession of several islands in this region as well—St Helena, Tristan da Cunha, Diego Alvarez (Gough Island) and Ascension, where the United States is leasing a military base. In particular, it was proposed that the wording "coastal states" in the Brazilian plan, which gives Great Britain and Chile the right to call themselves "coastal states" in the South Atlantic with all the consequences which follow from this, be replaced by the wording "the peoples of South America and Africa."<sup>8</sup>

Despite the fact that in the end the Malvinas problem was not mentioned in the Brazilian plan and their occupation by Great Britain was condemned only indirectly (in contrast to the occupation of Namibia, for example), President R. Alfonsin expressed support for the "philosophy" of the Brazilian proposal in June 1986. Later, speaking at the Eighth Conference of the Heads of State and Government of Nonaligned Countries in Harare, he stated that declaring the South Atlantic a zone of peace and demilitarizing it, which presupposes that the arms race in this region is halted and it is made nuclear-free, is fully in accord with the policy of peace and disarmament being conducted steadfastly by his government.

Uruguay expressed unconditional support for the Brazilian initiative. On the eve of the 41st UN General Assembly Session, President Julio Maria Sanguinetti stated that his government not only will support the proposal by J. Sarney, but will also make "decisive efforts" to ensure that it is put into effect. Uruguay's representative to the United Nations stressed that the zone of peace and cooperation is particularly important juridically and politically, inasmuch as it represents a specific action for strengthening peace and developing cooperation in a vast region of the globe.

Brazil's initiative also was supported by the majority of African countries, with whom it has organized active and long-term cooperation. Practically all the states on the Atlantic coast of this region became coauthors of the draft resolution presented for the vote.

The position of a number of countries in the West was ambiguous. Thus France, which spoke in support of the initiative in the preliminary stage of its drafting, referred

in the course of the session to the fact that the status of the zone may complicate the problem of freedom of navigation in the South Atlantic.

As already noted, the only country voting against the ZMS was the United States. In justifying its position, the American representative stated that the zone is being established because of a decision "from above," and not as the result of discussions among the states in the region. In his view, the text of the resolution also may limit the freedom of navigation and transit recognized by international law. The absence in the draft resolution of a precise definition of the water areas in the part of the zone between Africa and South America also drew an objection from the United States.<sup>9</sup> The argument cited influenced the position of Spain and Algeria, which approved the plan with reservations as a result. However, the references to these arguments were used only as a formal pretext for rejecting the Brazilian plan.

The real reason for the rejection is concealed in the fundamentally negative position of the Reagan administration with respect to all initiatives involving the establishment of zones of peace. This is indicated by Washington's blocking of international efforts directed at demilitarizing the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, and other regions in the world. Such an attitude naturally stems from American imperialism's hegemonist claims. Thus, the report by President R. Reagan "On U. S. Strategy in the Area of National Security" (January 1987) states that the United States will continue in the future "to maintain large land, naval and air forces during peacetime in Europe and the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, as well as other forces in the Western Hemisphere and the Indian Ocean."<sup>10</sup>

Military and strategic considerations also determined Great Britain's position. It formally spoke in support of the resolution. However, London's true attitude was demonstrated as early as the following day after its adoption in the United Nations, when a unilateral decision was made to establish a 200-mile "exclusive economic zone" and a 150-mile fishing zone around the Malvinas (Falkland Islands). This decision by the Tory government, combined with its refusal to hold talks with Argentina on decolonization of the archipelago and expansion of its military presence in this region, was considered by the international community as an attempt to torpedo the UN decision.

The governments of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay gave a particularly sharp response to Britain's actions. They announced from the Brazilian capital that Great Britain's position nullifies the efforts to establish the ZMS in the South Atlantic. The Uruguayan Government stressed in a special communiqué that "any unilateral action can only contribute to the creation of dangerous tension in the region."<sup>11</sup>

There are also Latin American opponents to the establishment of a ZMS in the South Atlantic. Thus, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador, as well as St Vincent and the Grenadines and St Christopher and Nevis, practically came out against the Brazilian proposal by refusing to take part in the voting in the United Nations. In addition, there is also opposition to the plans to establish the zone from the military circles of certain countries in the region. In particular, Chilean Admiral Jose Toribio Merino, the air force commander and member of the military junta, characterized the UN decision to declare the South Atlantic a zone of peace and cooperation as "very wrong," considering the fact, he said, that about 60 percent of the oil needed by the West is shipped around Cape Horn and south of the Cape of Good Hope. Naturally, he sees a threat to these shipments from "the Russians."<sup>12</sup> Such views are also heard at times from some of the Brazilian military, which, judging by a report from the newspaper CLARIN, do not rule out the possibility that a regional organization will be created to defend the South Atlantic.<sup>13</sup>

The Soviet Union and other states in the socialist community expressed active support for the Brazilian initiative. The Soviet position with respect to zones of peace is an integral part of the overall foreign policy of the CPSU. The New Edition of the Party Program expresses the conviction that "Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Pacific and Indian Ocean basins can and should become zones of peace and good-neighborliness."<sup>14</sup> (It is appropriate to recall in this regard that it was precisely the Soviet Union that first advanced the concept of creating nuclear-free zones in 1956.) For this reason, the proposal to establish a ZMS in the South Atlantic met with a ready response in our country. Thus, A. A. Gromyko, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, stated at a dinner in honor of President R. Alfonsin: "The Soviet Union is doing everything possible to create an atmosphere of trust and cooperation among states in all regions of the world and all the continents. The initiative by certain Latin American countries, including Argentina, to turn the South Atlantic into a zone of peace and cooperation, free of nuclear weapons, essentially has something in common with this concept as well."<sup>15</sup>

The UN decision to declare the South Atlantic a zone of peace and cooperation is an important international event. It was convincing testimony that new political thinking, which is in accord with the realities of the nuclear and space age, is paving the way more and more broadly in the international arena and in Latin America in particular, improving the chances of peace-loving forces in the struggle for mankind's survival. Addressing young diplomats at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this very spirit on 13 May this year, Brazilian President Jose Sarney said that the Brazilian plan to turn the South Atlantic into a zone free of nuclear weapons is an important landmark in developing a system of broad cooperation among states.

### Footnotes

1. Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Guinea-Bissau, Congo, Liberia, Nigeria, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Equatorial Guinea, and Uruguay.
2. Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, the FRG, France, and Japan.
3. Documents of the United Nations, A/Res/41/11, 6 November 1986, pp 1-2.
4. The Malvinas are now quite a powerful military base already, essentially at NATO's disposal. It is equipped with missile launchers, electronic spying equipment, and a large airfield capable of accommodating heavy combat and transport aircraft. A nuclear submarine, two destroyers, patrol vessels, supersonic Phantom fighters and helicopters are on continuous duty. There are 1,000 persons in the military garrison. If necessary, the British command can increase this number significantly by airlifting an assault force.
5. CLARIN, Buenos Aires, 23 September 1986
6. Ibid., 30 August 1986.
7. ZA RUBEZHOM, No 49, 1986, p 14.
8. CLARIN, 30 August 1986.
9. The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs believes that the southern boundary of the zone should be the 60th parallel of south latitude established by the Antarctic Treaty, which consolidated the demilitarization and nuclear-free status (denuclearization) of the sixth continent. The northern boundary could be a line extending from Cape Orange (on Brazilian territory) to Cap Blanc on the African coast.
10. Quoted from SShA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 4, 1987, p 11. In CLARIN, 1 November 1986.
12. Ibid., 20 October 1986.
13. Ibid., 29 October 1986.
14. Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New Edition). Moscow, 1986, p 69.
15. PRAVDA, 14 October 1986.

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**Guatemalan President on Domestic Policies,  
Regional Issues**

18070002c Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in  
Russian No 8, Aug 87 pp 34-38

[Interview with Guatemalan President Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo by LATINSKAYA AMERIKA correspondent A. N. Borovkov under the rubric "Contacts and Interviews": "The Spirit of Contadora Must Be Maintained": date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] Mr President, how do you assess your government's administration over the preceding period?

[Answer] In the five-year program we have worked out, the present administration is regarded as a shift from an authoritarian society to a democratic one. Over the past year and a half, definite progress has already been made in this regard. During the first year, provision was made, as we openly stated, "to put our house in order." In practice this meant putting the national economy, which was in a state of chronic crisis, in good order first of all, and secondly, creating conditions for the people's broad participation in political life. This process has not been completed, of course; it requires a great deal of time and further involvement by the most diverse strata of the society. It must be said that improvements have already taken place in the people's consciousness. The extremely small number of protest demonstrations, and on the other hand, statements in support of the government and the political vitality of numerous social groups which never before showed their worth in any way attest to this. The third objective was to introduce the principle of ideological pluralism in Guatemala's foreign policy and to turn it into a counterbalance to the conflicting situation in the Central American region.

I think that these three tasks have been carried out relatively successfully. We are satisfied with such a result and we are now shifting to the second stage in carrying out the program we have planned.

[Question] What do you plan to do to regenerate and develop the economy further?

[Answer] As I have already stated, we have succeeded in achieving the main objective—putting the economy in order, after stabilizing the monetary unit and receipt of foreign exchange necessary for development of our economy, which depends to a significant degree on the foreign market and raw material exports. I think that this has been accomplished. By the beginning of this year inflation had dropped from 35-40 percent to 15 percent, and a decrease in its level to 9-10 percent is possible by the end of the year.

Thus, obvious signs of the economy's revitalization, expressed not only in price stabilization but in increased employment, have been displayed. Statistical data point directly to this. Thus, based on the latest surveys by a

nongovernment organization alone, we believe that the problem of the increase in the cost of living, which reached its peak at the end of last year, is no longer acute.

In the near future, our task will be chiefly to stimulate the economy on the basis of three specific measures: involvement of the new strata of the population—the small and medium-size agricultural and industrial producers—in commodity-money relationships; expansion of markets, which involves putting on the agenda the question of the need to develop the country's relations within the "south-south" framework (such relations already exist with Mexico, Argentina and Central America); and finally, making large state capital investments in the infrastructure and services field.

[Question] In your view, Mr President, what is needed for more successful implementation of the democratic plan set forth in your program?

[Answer] Confidence in the process, first of all. We are trying to demonstrate in deeds that we are following the path of consolidating democracy in the country. Then, development of international economic and political relations and reinforcement on this basis of international organizations' confidence in Guatemala. And finally, help for peace and stability in Central America.

I think that countries which view the process of democratization under way in Guatemala with interest or sympathy could provide assistance in consolidating it.

Extending democracy on the basis of political pluralism enables us to include in this process all the new social groups which were previously barred from political life. It is possible that we will succeed in the future in involving the groups engaging in armed combat in the country's mountainous regions as well. We feel there is no necessity for such a struggle now, but at the same time, we realize perfectly well how difficult it is for those who chose this path to reject it. And understanding this, we are working to establish conditions which make it possible for people to return to peaceful life.

Extensive explanatory work is needed to orient all strata of society to achieve national goals, of course. For this, the government's activity should be directed not at protecting the interests of one economic sector or another or a single political party, but at protecting the national interests, which will promote the unity of the different forces, which in turn will lessen the polarization and hostility among them.

[Question] What steps have been undertaken to change the role of the army in Guatemalan society?

[Answer] Specific steps have been taken. Two are political in nature and one is purely administrative. The latter involves a change in the role and importance of the army centrally and locally. This concerns the transfer of executive functions for implementing government decisions to elective

authorities or civil authorities appointed by the president. This required reorganization of the structure of the armed forces and centralization of military authority. Previously, the basis of the army hierarchy consisted of 26 commanders, who were sort of military governments locally. Now it has been decided to concentrate all administration of the armed forces and control over them in the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.

As far as steps of a political nature are concerned, one of them is conducting ideological work among officers to explain the army's new role in the society. The army must provide for security by supporting the political decisions adopted by the civil authorities. This does not mean to completely remove military personnel from administration of the country and to take away their responsibility, as this has been traditional in Latin America, which amounts to a great historical error, in my view. On the contrary, it is necessary to involve them in the processes that are taking place.

The second political step is a reconsideration of the doctrine of "national security," which has become a turning point in the life of Guatemalan society, in my view, for it is linked with the change in the role of the armed forces. "National security" is not our government's first concern. Its principal task is to create the conditions for the country's economic development. Consequently, the army is entrusted with providing for political and social stability, and the doctrine of "national security" is being replaced by the "doctrine of stabilization" for this reason.

[Question] What do you see as the fundamental ways to resolve the Central American crisis? What are the prospects for political and economic development in this region, from your point of view?

[Answer] The basic foreign policy goal which we have set in relations with the countries of Central America is a Utopia, but it is necessary to strive to realize it, keeping historical perspective in mind. Central America should proceed on the path of integration and unification. This does not involve the establishment of a unified state. A federation of Central American states may be organized. In order to reach this goal we should provide for peace in the region and establish conditions for the harmonious development of multilateral and bilateral political, social, cultural and economic relations. This is impossible now because of ideological differences. In order to change the situation, we need to give new substance to subregional processes. We are proceeding from the assumption that foreign policy should be devoid of ideological prejudices and complexes, for each people determine the political character of a government themselves. We are pursuing these objectives in the interests of Central American unity, economic development, political stability, and peace itself in the region.

In this connection, we put the principle of noninterference in ideological and political struggle in first place. Moreover, we reject it. This is the essence of our policy of active neutrality. The latter is different from the traditional, familiar type—"neither for nor against." Our neutrality is different—active—in nature, because we are an integral part of the subregion and consequently, we are interested in efforts to resolve the Central American crisis. And by diplomatic means.

Our next objective is to bring Central America outside the limits of the East-West conflict. This matter must be put before the United States and the West European powers as well as the Soviet Union. But the Central American countries must discuss the entire range of problems and come to a mutual understanding for this. In this connection, we are advancing a proposal to create a Central American parliament, in which each country could take part through representatives elected by its people. The parliament would be a kind of first step toward unification of the countries of Central America and resolution of the entire range of its complex problems. It should be noted that the policy of active neutrality and the concept of a Central American parliament is being advanced by us in an organic interrelationship.

Now, how does this combine with the efforts of the Contadora Group? We believe that the countries which are part of it were the first to raise the question of the necessity for a search for solutions to the problems facing both Latin America and Central America by the very states in the region. The spirit of Contadora must be maintained. It supports the efforts of Central American countries and clearly defines their role as direct participants in the tragedy taking place which are striving to make their own contribution to solution of the subregion's problems. We think that separating the Central American problem from the Contadora Group's activity means isolating ourselves from Latin America and being deprived of political support in striving to provide for peace and stability in the subregion.

[Question] How does the Guatemalan Government regard trade, cultural, and diplomatic ties with socialist countries and the Soviet Union in particular?

[Answer] As a sovereign state which conducts its foreign policy on the basis of the principle of ideological pluralism, Guatemala intends to maintain relations with those countries with which it is interested in having ties. On the whole, we believe that we need to continuously expand contacts with all countries in the world, regardless of their political and ideological positions. A number of steps have been taken in this direction. We have begun a political dialogue with states with which we previously had practically no ties whatever. We have received a number of delegations from socialist states. In the course of meetings, talks have been held on organizing trade contacts. Diplomatic relations have been established with one of these countries—Yugoslavia, which can promote future development of cooperation with other

socialist states, including the Soviet Union. (Editorial footnote: Diplomatic relations between the USSR and Guatemala have existed formally since 1944.)

We are interested in cultural and scientific ties with the USSR. The question of possible tours by Soviet artists in Guatemala has already been resolved. The matter of scientific ties between the two countries is on the agenda as well.

Talks with certain socialist countries with regard to an exchange of visits by delegations are under way. In particular, an agreement in principle on this matter has already been reached with the Chinese People's Republic.

For their part, representatives of Guatemalan industrial and trade circles have expressed their intention to visit the Soviet Union for the purpose of establishing trade relations. We are prepared to support efforts such as this, of course.

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### Scholars Discuss Nonaligned Movement, Latin America's Role

18070002d Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 8, Aug 87 pp 47-75

[Editorial Report] Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian Number 8, August 1987 carries on pages 47-75 the first part of a discussion entitled "The Nonaligned Movement—A New State of Development." Participants in the discussion include: from the Institute of Latin America under the USSR Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences A. N. Glinkin, Candidate of Economic Sciences N. G. Zaytsev, Candidate of Historical Sciences T. V. Goncharova, Candidate of Historical Sciences A. A. Matlina and Candidate of Historical Sciences S. V. Tagor; from the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Candidate of Historical Sciences I. N. Zorina and Doctor of Historical Sciences Ya. Ya. Etinger; from the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences A. I. Chicherov; and from the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Candidate of Historical Sciences L. A. Vyalimaa. V. M. Gavrilov, employee of the journal, also took part.

Topics presented were: "From Delhi to Harare" by A. N. Glinkin; "New Trends" by A. I. Chicherov; "Disarmament for Development of Arms at the Expense of Development?" by I. N. Zorina; "African Nonalignment" by L. A. Vyalimaa; and "On the Path of Specifying Goals and Forms" by S. V. Tagor.

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### Book on Brazil's Change From Military to Civil Rule Reviewed

18070002e Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 8, Aug 87 pp 129-130

[Review by A. O. Tonin of book "Braziliya do i posle 'chuda'" [Brazil Before and After the "Miracle"] by T. Yu. Zabelina and A. A. Sosnovskiy under the rubric "Reviews," Izdatelstvo "Nauka," Moscow, 1986, 176 pages]

[Text] Lately specialists' attention has been drawn to the complex sociopolitical processes taking place in Brazil during the transition from many years of rule by the military regime to a civilian government. The popular scientific work being reviewed provides quite a good foundation for gaining an understanding of the sociopolitical development of this largest Latin American country, the example of which has influenced other states in the region.

The greater part of the work is prefaced by a brief historical discussion which brings the reader to the phenomenon called "the Brazilian miracle" and marks the book's distinctive chronological pivotal point. The authors dwell on the national characteristics of the Brazilian military regime, the doctrine of "national security," the economic "model," "liberalization," and a number of other phenomena. The analysis of the conception of the Brazilian society's socio-political development during the period of military rule, worked out at the Higher Military School, is an obvious success. At the same time, the concept of "the ruling circles of Brazil" used frequently in the work could have been explained in greater detail.

The description of certain specific features of the military regime and the effort to trace the influence of the individual characteristics of one official or another on the course of events also is to the authors' credit. Considerable attention is devoted to Brazil's political parties, and their development is traced during various periods of military rule. The book provides information on the trade union movement, economic processes, and a number of other problems. The reader is thus presented with the basic components of the Brazilian political process of the past 20 years in detailed form.

On the whole, the authors provide a correct assessment of the transition from the military to the civilian form of government, stressing the important role of the tradition of compromises inherent in Brazilian political development. However, it must not be overlooked that the basic compromise—between the adherents of the old and the standard-bearers of the new—was shaped from many lesser concessions which were made for the most diverse reasons and which exerted specific influence on the entire process of democratization. Apparently the size of the book and the extent of the narrative devoted to analysis—because of the popular scientific nature of the work—did not make it possible to dwell in more detail on problems such as the relationships between the church and the political institutions, the organs of central and local executive authority, and the like.

A wide range of sources was utilized in preparing the book. It was written in lively style in language easy to understand. It appears, however, that superlative degrees, which are not always appropriate when the discussion refers to the political process, are encountered more frequently than necessary.

The authors made a number of successful attempts to theoretically comprehend the Brazilian version of the transition from a military regime to a bourgeois democracy. It is hoped that they will succeed in returning to this problem and try to describe just what takes place after the "miracle," having put much emphasis not on the study of events and facts, but on the internal mechanics of the process of democratization in Brazil.

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**Collective Work on Central American Peace Outlook, Contadora**

*18070002f Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 8, Aug 87 pp 130-131*

[Review by B. F. Martynov of book "Razvitiye i mir v Tsentralnoy Amerike" [Development and Peace in Central America], also published in Spanish with the same title [Desarrollo y Paz en Centroamerica], by Americans B. (Begley) and R. (Fineberg) and Colombians R. Pardo and F. Cepeda, staff members of the Center for International Studies (CEI) of the University of the Andes, Bogota, 1986, 128 pages]

[Text] A new book prepared by staff members of the Center for International Studies (CEI) of the University of the Andes continues the series of studies on Central American problems. On one hand, the authors set themselves the objective of closely examining and making more specific the conclusions with respect to the causes of the Central American crisis (these chapters were written by American scientists B. (Begley) and R. (Fineberg), staff members at the CEI); on the other hand, their objective was to analyze prospects for the Contadora Group's activity (this part was written by Colombian researchers R. Pardo and F. Cepeda).

In the introduction to their section the American authors note: "We do not share the conviction that the Central American problem threatens the national security interests of the United States" (p 16). They see the basic cause of the current crisis in the fundamental contradiction between the rapidly developed economic structures of countries in the subregion during the 1960's and 1970's and the political institutions which were poorly adapted to these changes, which led to severe inequality in the distribution of incomes. At the end of the 1970's and in the early 1980's, this contradiction was aggravated by the

world economic crisis, which led to a sharp drop in prices for traditional goods exported by Central America and the sudden rise in foreign debts.

Reflecting on the political systems which could become firmly established in Central America, (Begley) considers "free democracy," which assumes the complete freedom of market forces; "just democracy," which stipulates definite intervention by the state in economic activity "for the purpose of distributing incomes more fairly"; and finally, "revolutionary democracy," in the example of Nicaragua. (Begley) believes that "free democracy" is unacceptable for Central American conditions, "inasmuch as it will not receive sufficient mass support for the formation of a stable civilian government" (p 49). He supports "just democracy," which is capable of blocking the path of "revolutionary democracy," in his view.

Proceeding from this thesis, the author believes that the Reagan administration's policy of force is impeding the establishment of a "just democracy." (Begley) and (Fineberg) characterize the U. S. policy with respect to Nicaragua as basically incorrect. Examining the conditional [konyunkturnyy] nature of the aid provided by the United States to Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador, they note that "the U.S. hostility with respect to Nicaragua has a negative effect not only on the economy of this country, but all Central America as well" (p 61).

The American authors' general conclusions with respect to the prospects for settlement of the Central American crisis are quite pessimistic. "...The United States," (Begley) and (Fineberg) note, "cannot or does not wish to achieve political stability in the subregion. As a result, it will continue as before to experience for itself all the consequences of political violence... which cannot in any way contribute to the success of negotiations" (p 68).

Cepeda and Pardo arrive at similar conclusions. They express doubts that Contadora is capable of continuing peacemaking activity after the United States has become convinced of the activity's incompatibility with its concept of "national security" (p 111). At present, the Colombian scientists note, the United States possesses enough levers, primarily economic, to weaken that comparative autonomy achieved by Latin American countries during the 1970's, which deprives their diplomats of maneuverability in the Central American problem. As if to nullify the book's title, its authors foresee not development and peace, but continuation of a protracted conflict of low intensity for Central America in the near future.

Such a pessimistic forecast, in our view, is too categorical, chiefly because the authors themselves do not rule out the possibility that neighborly relations may be developed between the "revolutionary democracy" and its neighbors in the subregion. Only the current Reagan administration rejects this possibility, but this position is being subjected to more and more criticism within the United States. The opinion expressed by (Begley) and (Fineberg) attest to this, in particular. As far as "stagnation" of the Contadora

process is concerned, more likely this may involve only the survival of certain forms and the necessity of searching for other, more collective forms for Latin American solution of the Central American crisis.

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### Conference Discusses Role of Culture in Developing Countries

18070002g Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 8, Aug 87 pp 135-138

[Article by E. G. Yermolyeva and O. L. Zakharova under the rubric "Scientific Life": "Cultural Processes in Developing Countries"]

[Text] The international conference "Cultural Processes in Developing Countries," organized by the Problem-Solving Commission on Multilateral Cooperation of the academies of sciences of socialist states, "The Economics and Politics of Developing Countries," attached to the USSR Academy of Sciences, was held at the end of 1986 in the Oriental Studies Institute (IVAN). The IVAN, together with the Africa Institute (IA), with the active participation of researchers from other academic institutions, in particular the Latin America Institute (ILA), the academies of union republics and VUZes—from Leningrad, Rostov, Astrakhan and Chernovtsy, were the direct organizers of the conference. In addition, scientists from the GDR and the People's Republic of Bulgaria took part in the work of the conference.

As noted in the conference's theses, experience from the 1960's to the early 1980's has proved that culture not only plays a significant role in the social and political life of "Third World" states, but determines the nature of their self-determination to a large extent as well. It becomes the arena for a particularly intense ideological struggle precisely in the states of this group. Soviet social science has already accomplished a great deal in researching the culture of the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. However, with the abundance of empirical materials comes the obvious demand to analyze them, as the theses stressed. The losses from the significant gap between accumulation and analysis are mutual. For this reason, the basic objective of the conference was to summarize the experience gathered by Soviet scientists in studying the culture of developing countries, bring to light its common and regional features, and analyze the nature and interaction of the different factors which determine the basic trends of cultural development in this group of states.

The opening report at the plenary meeting was given by Ye. P. Chelyshev (IVAN), corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He emphasized that the contradictoriness and multistratal nature of cultural processes, resulting from the many different ways of life in their social structure, are a characteristic of the cultural

and ideological situation in all developing countries. The process of interaction between national cultures and Western culture which takes place through the mechanism of cultural exchange is also ambiguous in nature. In the speaker's opinion, the justified criticism of imperialist states' cultural expansion should be combined with an objective assessment of Soviet specialists' work in this field. It should be recognized that our ideological opponents have made substantial advances in intensive cultural exchange with countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Taking this into account, we have to expand the scope of research on the problems of the influence of Western culture and ideology on developing states. On the other hand, expansion of Soviet cultural exchange with "Third World" countries leads to the requirement to assess the real influence of Soviet cultural programs on the different strata of the population.

The address by Doctor of Economic Sciences V. Sheynis (World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences) touched on the problem of forecasting the socioeconomic and sociocultural development of "Third World" countries. In the speaker's opinion, development in the majority of these countries in the coming decades will be oriented capitalistically, although this basic trend cannot help but experience the opposing influences of indigenous sociocultural stereotypes.

The report by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences B. S. Yerasov (IVAN) singled out the basic factors because of which culture—together with physical production and the concerns of the authorities—becomes an important system-forming basis under the conditions of a developing society. In the first place, no matter how strong the social and class hierarchy is in the different areas of culture, it functions as a common birthright and embodies the principle of universality. Secondly, culture as an expression of spiritual production may embrace those aspects of objective reality embodied in the specificity of Asian, African or Latin American activity more directly than the physical factors of production. Precisely for this reason, the assertion of "originality" and "endogenicity" is developed in it most of all and most successfully. Thirdly, culture provides the society with a high degree of historical continuity. The experience which also becomes one of the most important reasons for the existence of a given ethnic group, nation or civilization is preserved and passed on because of it. Finally, the fourth reason is that the cultural area, together with politics, provides a persuasive basis for affirming national opposition to the West and independence.

Doctor of Historical Sciences V. A. Kuzmishchev emphasized in his report that "the economic factor has been and continues to be the principal obstacle on the path of thorough and successful development of a democratic current within the framework of the national cultures of Latin America's capitalist countries." Concentration in the hands of the state and private (often transnational) corporations and monopolies of the mass

media (including the press, television, radio, publishing, film rental and film production, and so forth) creates favorable conditions for dissemination of the bourgeois and dominant (according to V. I. Lenin) culture, but does not protect it from degradation and degeneracy, particularly because of the active intrusion of "mass culture" into Latin America from the United States and other economically developed countries in the West, as well as the broad dissemination in the region of local "mass culture" developed in the form and likeness of the foreign "mass culture."

The report by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences A. S. Mulyarchik (United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences) was devoted to certain new aspects of the policy of "cultural imperialism" conducted during the 1980's in "Third World" countries by Western Powers under the slogan of "free cultural exchange." The United States considers the cultural and ideological field to be basic in the conflict between capitalism and socialism, and it actively reviews the forms and directions of cultural policy. For this reason, a new upsurge in the United States' international ties with "Third World" countries was observed in the early 1980's, during which special emphasis was put on the philanthropic activity of American "charitable" funds, as well as the affiliates of TNK's [transnational corporations].

V. A. Verbenko (NOVOSTI Press Agency) also drew attention to the "new democracy" scheme as the basic strategic tool for the United States' cultural and ideological expansion in the "Third World." He cited significant figures on the scope of imperialism's cultural penetration in developing countries. However, in all fairness, he noted in his address, relations in the cultural field with states in the West cannot be viewed only with a "minus" sign. Rapid development of mass media with the latest technical facilities has taken place in certain regions of the "Third World" under their influence in many respects.

The statement by Doctor of Historical Sciences A. G. Smirnov (IVAN) reaffirmed the importance of studying the problem of education in developing countries as a cultural phenomenon, inasmuch as study of its economic and social aspects alone is not always sufficient.

The conference examined the organizational forms of training personnel from developing countries in the USSR and Western states and the problems of organizing education in different regions of the "Third World." V. D. Adamets, deputy chief of the Foreign Student Instruction Administration of the USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, and Candidate of Historical Sciences Yu. N. Kozhayev provided

detailed reports on the first group of problems. Candidate of Historical Sciences V. P. Belyayev (ILA) told of the intensive struggle between different political and ideological forces in Latin America over the question of educational reform.

Many ILA staff members took part in discussing the topic "Processes in Artistic Culture." Candidate of Historical Sciences N. S. Konstantinova delivered the report "On the Problem of the Regional and the National in Latin American Theater," noting that Latin American dramatic and theater arts are now going through a period of such significant upswing that it is customary to call it a "theatrical revolution." The report by L. V. Rostotskaya clearly traced the dependence of the national cinema in Latin American countries on the political policy: the progressive regimes support the national film arts, and the reactionary ones usually protect the purely commercial genres. The report by M. B. Stukalina, "The Role of the Mass Media in Brazil's Cultural Life" stressed that this country's press, radio and television underwent serious changes in the course of democratization. N. A. Sheleshneva analyzed the nature of the opposition to the West's cultural expansion in countries on the continent, both by the governments themselves and the leading artistic intelligentsia. Together with the concept of originality, this trend is most typical of Latin American painting over the past decade.

In closing the conference, Ye. P. Chelyshev noted that it had positive results not only in the statement of important problems but in the critical creative discussion on individual aspects of cultural research. For more successful development of work in this direction, it is necessary to rid ourselves of the passion of "theory for the sake of theory" and the weak link between scientific research and practice and to overcome obsolete concepts and outdated stereotypes in evaluating manifestations in the present, inasmuch as the true historical method is made up of a dialectical record of the changing picture of the "Third World."

The managers of sections who addressed the concluding meeting reaffirmed the necessity for a more thorough and comprehensive scientific understanding of the cultural processes in "Third World" countries based on the development of a single methodological approach and possibly with the involvement of a wider range of specialists. In addition, an appeal was made for closer ties in scientific and theoretical work between Soviet orientalists and Latin American specialists in order to increase the effectiveness of culturological research.

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